


JEAN FREDERIC
HERBART

GABRIEL COMPAYRÉ

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PIONEERS IN EDUCATION

HERBART
AND EDUCATION BY INSTRUCTION

BY

GABRIEL COMPAYRÉ

CORRESPONDENT OF THE INSTITUTE; DIRECTOR OF THE ACADEMY
OF LYONS; AUTHOR OF "PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO
EDUCATION," "LECTURES ON PEDAGOGY,"
"A HISTORY OF PEDAGOGY," ETC.

TRANSLATED BY

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Pioneers in Education

A NEW SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS ON THE GREAT
EDUCATORS

By GABRIEL COMPAYRÉ

*Correspondant de l'Institut; Recteur de l'Académie de
Lyon; Author of "Psychology Applied to Educa-
tion," "Lectures on Pedagogy," "A History of
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PREFACE

WE desire to call attention to a thinker who is worthy of being placed in the very first rank of educationists, both as theorist and practical teacher.

Rousseau was a romance writer; Herbert Spencer, a brilliant essayist in the field of education. Herbart was at once a schoolmaster and a profound philosopher; and if it could be said of him that he was "the father of modern psychology," he has no less a claim to be considered the founder of a scientific pedagogy, with psychology as its basis.

Pestalozzi, a man of admirable natural gifts, but gifts which lacked the support of a sound psychology, had only dim perceptions and "partial intuitions"; and, also, his theory concerned almost entirely the education of little children and elementary instruction.

Herbart had all the resources of a subtle dialectician and of a learned psychologist, and he built up with hands powerful, but somewhat awkward, a whole system; a system wide and full, which embraces the whole field of education and is applica-

ble to every style,—to youth as well as to childhood. His works no longer present to us disconnected opinions, *disjecti membra poetæ*, but a solidly linked and harmonized doctrinal whole. Parts of it are certainly open to criticism, but every one must acknowledge and admire its firm, well-marshalled order. In addition to this, we note that he was not satisfied with theorizing and arguing about the general laws of education; he studied narrowly and with infinite care the smallest details of applied pedagogy; he did not keep the science apart from the art of education; he extended the same watchful care over both together; his science was replete with abstract conceptions and bold generalizations; his art descended to the smallest details and abounded in methods and practical devices.

We shall try to give an idea of this vast system, with the intention of throwing light on a theory of education, which is at times obscure and always complicated; we shall, so to say, try to make this somewhat muddy stream clearer; and this not without the fear of weakening it by our abridgment and of making it shallower by our explanations.

The reasons, in our opinion, why Herbart's system of education is to be recommended is, in

the first place, because he claims to have established it on experience,—on the natural history of the mind. But if Herbart is a realist who breaks with the metaphysical dreams of his age, in his own way he is also an idealist; and education as he conceives it, education aiming above all at forming the individual, the human creature, is in no way utilitarian. It is in a high degree moral, proclaiming as the chief ends of instruction, morality and virtue. It is a universal education, offering invitations to all men. Finally, it is a democratic education, which counsels children to seek the company of workmen and peasants; like to the education which made Edgar Quinet, our fellow-countryman, a simple, free soul, loved by the people from his earliest years in a rural district of his native land.

It is a hundred years since Herbart published his treatise on *General Pedagogy*; it dates from 1806. And yet, this book, now old, answers perhaps better to the needs and aspirations of the hour than any other. At this time, in fact, when democratic peoples are seeking more and more to base their morality on science, it is surely worth while to listen to the voice of a philosopher who believed, and tried to demonstrate, that all education depends alone on instruction, and that ideas

and knowledge are the source of good feeling and virtue. When we feel that faith in education is increasing every day, and, too, the hope that as it advances it will guarantee to human societies a better future, might we not think that only yesterday were said these noble words of Herbart: "The interest which we take in education is one of the forms of interest which we take in human beings. Our hopes find refuge in the hearts of the young, in the expectation that men, when they are more carefully educated, will attain to things yet beyond our view."

HERBART

I

THERE is little to tell about the life of Herbart. It was an unbroken, simple, and peaceful life, comparable to that of Kant; the noble life of a thinker wholly devoted to study, who never let distractions withdraw him from meditation. There are few events to be recorded from the laborious years of a professor who left his study only for his lecture-room, other than changes of residence and the publication of his books.

Herbart was born at Oldenburg on the 4th of May, 1776; he died at Göttingen, the 11th of August, 1841. He differed from Kant in this, that he travelled, either as student or professor, to all quarters of Germany, while Kant never left Königsberg, his native town. During the years 1788 to 1794, he took his first course of higher studies at the Gymnasium of Oldenburg, where his grandfather had been head-master. Then, from 1794 to 1798, he attended the University of Jena. Jena was at that time one of the most brilliant centres for the

study of German philosophy, and Fichte was teaching there. After completing his university course, Herbart became a tutor, and from 1797 to 1800 he educated the three sons of the governor of Interlaken, M. de Steiger. It was while he lived in Switzerland that he had the good fortune to meet Pestalozzi, and to visit his school at Burgdorf in 1798. After a short stay at Halle, and a two years' residence at Bremen, where he studied and taught specially mathematics, he settled, from 1802 to 1809, at Göttingen. He was admitted to the doctor's degree there on theses purely pedagogical,¹ and he began his career as university teacher in the capacity of *Privat Docent* (private lecturer); after having declined an ordinary professorship which was offered to him at the University of Heidelberg, he became special lecturer at Göttingen.

To this period belongs the most important of his pedagogical writings, *General Pedagogy deduced from the Aim of Education*;² it was published in

¹ *Allgemeine Paedagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet*, which Herbart dedicated to his friend John Smith, senator of Bremen.

² These are the titles of the theses put forth by Herbart for his Doctorship: (1) *Ars pedagogica non experientia sola nititur*; (2) *In liberorum educatione matheseos et poeseos maxima vis est*; (3) *Institutio liberorum a Græcis litteris incipienda et quidem ab Homeri Odyssea, nullo omnino prosaico, minime autem chrestomatico, libro præmisso*.

1806. Already in this he was formulating the fundamental principles of his system of education; and in his subsequent works he only developed and explained the theories which he had projected before his thirtieth year. These theories were full of new ideas; this is seen especially in his *Outline of Pedagogical Lectures*,¹ which appeared in 1835, and which crowns all the others.

[It was the period when Germany was winning in the world of thought a fine revenge for its defeat on the battle-field.* Kant, it is true, had just died in 1804, and his successor was Krug, a man of no account. But Schelling was lecturing on philosophy at Würzburg, and Hegel at Jena. Celebrated additions were being made to the literature of education.] In 1803 appeared Kant's short essay *On Pedagogy*. Schwartz was beginning the same year the publication of his treatise on pedagogy, the *Theory of Education*. In 1807 Jean-Paul Richter published his *Levana*. Niemeyer was the heir of Francke, and Director of the Educational Institute at Halle; Francke greatly esteemed Herbart's work, quoted him often, and tried to keep him at

¹ *Umriß paedagogischer Vorlesungen*, 1835; 2d edition, 1841. The list of Herbart's pedagogical publications is long, but the two essential works are the *General Pedagogy* and the *Outlines of Pedagogical Lectures*. Let us add the *Aphorisms on Pedagogy* collected by Hartenstein.

Halle. Niemeyer, in 1806, was issuing the fifth edition of the third volume of his *Fundamental Principles of Education and Instruction*; Fichte was then delivering at Berlin his famous *Discourses to the German Nation*. Everywhere an intellectual movement of rare power was stirring and gathering strength. The young professor at Göttingen attached himself to this movement with all the ardour of an intellect matured already by patient reflection, and with the boldness of an exceptional originality; he resolved to occupy a position apart, and deliver severe attacks on the dominant philosophy. In the midst of idealists lost in dreams of metaphysical pantheism, Herbart at once announced himself an individualist and a realist who put faith only in experience. Already, in 1795, a philosopher only twenty years of age he had dared to measure himself with Schelling and criticise his theories, and to break with Fichte, whose course of lectures he was following. In 1802 he had openly rejected the doctrine of Kant in his doctor's theses; he there ardently opposed the theory of "transcendental liberty," and that of "forms of *a priori* intuition." Yet it was this same man who was called seven years later to occupy the chair of Kant at the University of Königsberg. He accepted it, so it would seem, rather to oppose the work of his prede-

cessor than to continue it. Herbart in no way concealed his joy at succeeding the greatest philosopher of modern times, dissent from his doctrine in no way diminishing the profound admiration inspired by his genius. "How great was my happiness," he said, "in occupying this most celebrated of all chairs of philosophy, the chair dreamt of in ambitious youth, when I was studying the works of the sage of Königsberg. . . ."

For more than twenty years, from 1809 to 1833, Herbart brought honour in his turn, in a new spirit, to the chair held by Kant with so much fame from 1770 to 1797. In 1831 another great honour just missed him, that of following Hegel, — who had recently died, — and occupying after him the Chair of Philosophy in the University of Berlin. But he was suspected of liberalism, and the spirit of reaction was triumphant in Prussia: he was not nominated. So it was to Göttingen that he returned, to take the place of Schulze, who also was an opponent of Kant.

How was the powerful intellect of Herbart formed? Certainly by grace of natural gifts. He was a striking refutation of his own psychological doctrine, defective in this respect, that it does not acknowledge any power whatever as innate in the soul. The force of his insight into philosophy revealed itself early with extraordinary precocity;

and circumstances, however favourable they may have been, would not suffice to explain the rapid expansion of his genius.] To the college graduate at Oldenburg in 1793 was assigned for the customary leaving oration this weighty subject: "Causes of the growth and decay of morality amongst the common people," and his speech made a great impression. The Jena student in 1796 wrote an important monograph, *On the Duty of the State in Education*.¹

[In his youth Herbart was specially remarkable for an extraordinary variety of pursuits: on the one hand for an aptitude for understanding science, physics as well as mathematics, and on the other for an equal delight in literature and the fine arts. "Poetry and mathematics," he said in one of his theses, "are the two fountains of education." Already in his play as a child he revealed the mental gift of the mathematician, before he applied it boldly to measuring psychological phenomena. Music had attractions for him, and this taste lasted all his life; he played different instruments, — the harp and violin, piano and violincello. He composed a sonata (1808), and he wrote a treatise on harmony. He was an eager student of antiquity, and yet imbued

¹ Herbart returned to this subject in an essay published in 1810, *On the Task of Public Authorities in Education*.

with the modern spirit. In conclusion, it might be said that he found in himself, in the manifold diversity of his own aptitudes, the germ that inspired his favorite theory, the theory which perceives in "many-sided interests," in a variety of tastes, the first condition for the successful training of the intellect.

The work of nature in forming the genius of Herbart was completed by intense personal effort and persistent application. In the midst of the disturbances of those troublous times, and while the wars of Napoleon were thundering their cannon, he buried himself in quiet study and solitary meditation. Finally, the tender solicitude of a devoted mother also helped and sustained him in his life of study. His father, a state councillor in Oldenburg, a cold and severe man, does not appear to have exercised any influence on the formation of his mind. It was otherwise in regard to his mother, a woman of superior mental gifts despite some defects of character. In fact, she was of a capricious and irritable disposition; in 1801 she separated from her husband and went to live in Paris, where two years afterward she died. She had taken pleasure in directing herself the education of her son during his early years; not, however, without severity and with some harshness of the Protestant type. On account of his

delicate health (when quite a child he burnt himself in a vessel of boiling water) she delayed sending him to the grammar school until he was thirteen. She learnt Greek in order to work with him. Ardently longing for the honours which she saw would be his in the future, she would not leave him even during his adolescent years. She followed him to Jena when he entered the university. She helped him to make acquaintance with noted people, for example, with Schiller. Certainly Herbart partly owed to her — to the enlightened care with which she surrounded his entrance into life — the unfolding of his faculties, or, to use his own expression (since he rejects the notion of faculties), the cultivation of his intellect and the early acquisition of a wealth of ideas. He was not an ungrateful son. He tenderly returned the affection of his mother. During his residence in Switzerland, in 1799, she was seriously ill; he was wretched at not being able to be with her, and he wrote to his friends: "My excellent mother, and eternal benefactress, how much suffering she has borne for me! How much I wish I could repay all her trouble! With what joy I would lighten her pain if that were possible! . . ."

It has been said that Herbart was a born schoolmaster, that he bore the sign on his forehead. That is quite true; but it must be added, and there

is no contradiction in this, that he was also born a philosopher. At twenty years of age he had explored all systems, the most ancient as well as the most recent. He was not less familiar with the philosophy of Plato, and even with that of Cicero, than with modern philosophy. Before he turned his attention to new speculations, and attempted to grasp the bold conceptions of his great contemporaries, he had had as his first master in his own home a disciple of Wolf, who initiated him into classical philosophy. Studied almost from childhood, during adolescence philosophy grew to be his only passion, and it continued a constant subject of reflection and research, no side of it being neglected. In 1808 he published a book on ethics, *General Practical Philosophy*; in 1816, his *Manual of Psychology*; in 1824, *Psychology as Science, founded, according to a New Method, on Experience, Metaphysics, and Mathematics*; in 1828, *General Metaphysics*. But all these essays at constructing a comprehensive philosophy tended, however, toward one end only, an end that lay nearer to his heart than any other, — to establish a science of education, the aim and completion of all other sciences.

If the philosopher Herbart was primarily a teacher, if he became a teacher in youth to remain a teacher until his last hour, this was in a great degree owing

to the practical knowledge which a three years' experience as tutor enabled him to acquire when a youth of twenty years. Circumstances made him in 1797 the tutor of the three sons of M. de Steiger, the oldest of whom was barely fourteen. This was a most fruitful experience, for he took his duties as instructor very seriously. He studied the characters of his pupils closely; he gathered observations, combined methods, thought out principles. The reports which he sent twice a month to M. de Steiger to keep him informed about the studies, the conduct, and progress of his children, — five of these reports have been preserved and published, — bear witness to the delicacy of his observing power, the clearness and fulness of his views, as well as to the nobility of the sentiments which inspired him in accomplishing a task which possessed his whole heart. He left his beloved pupils with regret; he never forgot them; their old tutor remained their friend; he corresponded with the eldest, Karl, until 1817. There is no doubt that it was this first contact with children, this practical initiation into the duties of a teacher, that decided forever the destiny of Herbart, determining the pedagogical tendency which was henceforth to control all his labours.

His residence in Switzerland was also the occa-

sion of his contact with Pestalozzi, and the influence exerted by the humble teacher of Burgdorf on the greatest of modern education philosophers is undeniable. Doubtless there are profound differences between them, all the distance which exists between the floating, vague enthusiasm of a dreamer, about whom it has been said justly that he had more heart than head, and the scholarly reflection, the methodical reasoning, of a profound and subtle psychologist. On the one side excessive and ill-regulated sentiment; nothing beyond "partial intuitions," flashes of genius, no well-defined system; on the other, an astonishing gift for abstraction and excessive systematization. In spite of these differences of temperament, the two had much in common.¹ Both accepted sense-perception as their starting-point. "Sense-perception," said Herbart, "is the great inspiring idea of the noble Pestalozzi; but he applied it over a narrow sphere, only that of elementary education." Herbart wanted it to illuminate all parts of teaching and education. "The essential element in Pestalozzi's method of instruction," he wrote again, "is that he

¹ The importance that Herbart attached to the work of Pestalozzi is shown by the fact that he devoted to him three pamphlets in succession: *On the Recent Book of Pestalozzi, How Gertrude, etc.*, 1802; *The A B C of Sense-perception*, 1802; and finally, *A Criterium for judging Pestalozzi's Method of Instruction*, 1804.

understood that the business of teaching is to construct the mind of the child by dint of definite and clear experiences." And that is also the essential element of Herbart's method. They agree regarding the necessity of selecting and adapting the various subjects of instruction in logical coördination according to the successive needs of the child as he develops naturally. The points of contact between them are numerous, the descent is clearly marked. But what in the case of Pestalozzi—a man unskilled, after all, in psychological questions—was only an outline, a kind of instinctive divination, this grew through the industrious application of Herbart into a scientific doctrine, a complete picture, all the details of which had been sought out and examined with minute care.]

The pedagogy of Herbart aspires, in short, to become a science. Here, for the first time in the history of education, we see ourselves confronted by a strongly organized body of doctrine. In conceiving his system Herbart was guided by abstract ideas; but, be it stated also, he was something more than a pure theorist. During the whole of his career as professor he was not satisfied to expound the result of his reflections *ex cathedra*; he always endeavoured to control and justify his ideas by experience. His first care on assuming the

chair at Königsberg, was to organize a kind of practical laboratory as companion to his lectures.¹ Kant had already thought of this when he said: "We need normal schools and experimental schools." It was this plan which Herbart made an effort to carry out by establishing a pedagogical seminary, where a few university students, eight or ten at most, prepared themselves to teach under his direction; and also a practice school, where a small number of children (at most fifteen) gave opportunity for experiment and for putting to proof and testing the theories of the master. Such was the origin of those institutions for pedagogical apprenticeship, which have been founded in Germany² during the last century at Halle, at Leipzig, and elsewhere; above all, at Jena, where first Stoy, the direct pupil of Herbart and a student in the Königsberg Seminary, and then Rein, one of the most eminent representatives of the Herbartian tradition, have followed their master.

His days being divided between occupations which were complements the one of the other, so

¹ See the details furnished by Rein about the pedagogical seminary in the *Encyklopädisches Handbuch der Pädagogik*, t. v. p. 208.

² See the recent interesting work of M. Chabot, *La Pédagogie au Lycée, notes de voyage sur les séminaires de gymnase en Allemagne*, Paris, Colin, 1903. See also, *La Préparation professionnelle à l'enseignement secondaire*, Paris, 1902, by Ch. V. Langlois.

arranged that he could at the same time both think and act, Herbart led a happy life: that is the usual lot of men who study and act both. Nothing in his life recalls the dramatic and vexed career of a Comenius or a Pestalozzi. Nevertheless, he suffered some reverses. About the year 1800, he passed through a wretched attack of pessimism. He lost his health; he felt as if each winter as it came would be his last. Also at the beginning of his career he was poor. At Göttingen, he was forced to exert himself to the utmost to make a bare living, wearing himself out by giving private lessons. And when the government demanded five hundred francs as his contribution to the war fund, he had difficulty in making both ends meet. A more lasting trouble was the small measure of success which attended his ideas of reform amongst colleagues indifferent and even hostile. He had to suffer and be vexed by the opposition of elderly professors, who were sunk in routine. He was struggling, he said, "against wind and tide."¹ And again, "My poor pedagogy has not been able to lift up its voice." But calm and patient by nature, Herbart followed his course, without letting himself be disturbed beyond meas-

¹ See the pamphlet published in 1814, *On my Struggle against the Prevailing Philosophy*.

ure by public opinion. "Although he was not averse to winning honour," wrote one of his biographers,¹ "he preferred to await it even vainly, rather than gain it by the methods of the charlatan — methods which he judged unworthy of philosophy, and which, in the case of some of his contemporaries, he severely castigated."²

For the rest, a union which he contracted in 1811 at Königsberg helped to render his life happy and fortunate. He married a young lady gifted with an intelligence which fitted her to be his intellectual companion. It was a marriage of mutual affection.

Herbart is represented by his biographer Hartenstein as an active man, of short stature, resolute gait, and with large, blue, glancing eyes. At a party in Königsberg, one evening, the company were engaged in the innocent amusement of playing charades. The word selected was "Herbart." The first syllable was represented as signifying "a

¹ The chief biographers of Herbart are Hartenstein and Fr. Bartholomäi. Bartholomäi's biography has been republished in the series of *Pädagogische Schriften*, edited by von Sallwürk; we quote from this edition at present.

² We pass over without comment the regrettable incident which occurred at Göttingen in 1837, consequent on the *coup d'état* of the king of Hanover. Herbart separated himself from his colleagues, many of whom resigned their chairs. The position he took up was regarded as a weak acquiescence in the tyranny of the government. To justify himself, he published a memorandum entitled, *Recollections of the Catastrophe at Göttingen in 1837*.

gentleman" (*Herr*), the second as "the ornament of the face" (*Bart*, beard). Miss Drake, a young English lady educated in Germany, was present, and when she was asked what the whole word represented, she exclaimed in earnest, "The whole, that is the ornament of the University." Herbart smiled. A few days later he asked and obtained the hand of the agreeable lady who had declared her sentiments so prettily. Their union of heart and mind lasted undimmed by any cloud for nearly thirty years. It was severed by the death of Herbart in 1841; a death swift and easy, which overtook him almost in his lecture-room. On the 9th of August he delivered a lecture, as usual, before a large audience. On the 11th he was attacked by apoplexy. "Blessed apoplexy," a great French surgeon called it.

II

IN the system in which Herbart sought to construct a new metaphysics, psychology, logic, æsthetics, and ethics, everything is interdependent and connected; and his pedagogy is only a fragment of the great whole. It is wrapped in a general conception of nature and humanity, which determines and explains it. It is, above all, directly dependent upon and derived from his psychology. If his *General Pedagogy*, at the time of its appearance in 1806, appeared obscure to his readers, that was because Herbart left the principles of his philosophy too much concealed in it: he had not yet explained them separately.

Although this is not the place either to study in detail or to criticise thoroughly Herbartian philosophy, it is yet necessary, if we wish to understand his pedagogy, to make a rapid review of his psychology: we shall select from it only what is indispensable.

The psychology of Herbart is usually represented as an attempt more or less useless to apply the cal-

culus to the measurement of mental phenomena.¹ In fact, Herbart considered the states of consciousness as so many forces, isolated and independent of each other, which, since quantity forms one of their elements, may be valued and numbered mathematically. But this is, however, merely a peculiar aspect of his theory, and the one most disputed.

Herbart's general psychology is a matter apart from these mathematical speculations; it is new, profound, and lays claim to originality, although it is allied to the empiricism of Locke, of Hume, and Condillac.

To Herbart we owe, at least, the first attempt to frame a scientific psychology—a psychology which seeks to establish a definite order and a determined sequence amongst the states of consciousness. It is a bold rejoinder to the idealism of Kant and Fichte. To the philosophers who regarded the world, time, and space, as a purely

¹ It was especially in the *Letters on the Application of Psychology to Pedagogy*, addressed to Professor Griepenkel, and written towards 1831, that Herbart indulged in mathematical speculation and in abstract digressions. Although we owe thanks to M. Dereux for having conscientiously analyzed this work in his articles in the *Revue Pédagogique* in 1890, we must not look to that work to find the essential ideas of Herbart or, at least, the ideas which ought to live. The *Letters* are an incomplete work, and the author treats in them only the preliminaries of education; he examines the diverse temperaments which condition the degree of education possible to the child. The projected work was to comprise three parts, of which he composed only the first.

subjective creation of the intellect, Herbart opposed a conception of the mind which sees in it only a reflection of things outside, a construction from sense experiences. To the metaphysicians who represented everything as issuing from within the soul and the thinking subject, a realist replied who with extreme reaction claimed to prove that everything emanates from objects and from the external world, and who will trace down to sense-perception all the conditions of the birth and development of mind.

The point of departure of the psychological conception of Herbart is that there are no faculties in the soul. This must be accepted in its strictest sense. Herbart does not admit in the mind any original force, any native energy. Others had dismissed to the land of dreams the old machinery of innate ideas: Herbart went farther,—he rejected not only ideas but innate faculties. The faculty theory is, in his view, only a mythology. Faculties are idols that must be overthrown. In the soul there are only successive happenings. The mind, in its original state, is merely a *tabula rasa*. It has no content. It is created bit by bit, thanks to representations or ideas (*Vorstellungen*) brought to it by sense-perception. According to the popular view (and whatever Herbart thought, this is the cor-

rect view), nature has endowed the mind with latent powers, inherited or innate, and these mental predispositions, developing with the help of the senses, give birth to the inner world of thought. Mind is thus conceived as a primitive force which puts something of its own — more or less, according to the system — into its successive acquisitions. In Herbart's theory there is nothing of this sort. To Euclid you grant his axioms and postulates, and he produces from these a whole geometry. In the same way you grant to Herbart his sense representations, and by an ingenious manipulation of these representations, from their interplay and reciprocal reactions, he claims to build a mind, to form sensibility and will, as well as intellect. According to him it is not mind which, preëxisting at least as power, pursues ideas ; it is, on the contrary, representations or ideas which, following each other and uniting together, in a way pursue mind, and by forming groups end by fashioning it. They enter the soul through the avenue of the senses, and become conscious, as it were, by accident ; they pass out and return as they please, or rather, as it pleases other ideas, which now summon them, now repulse or take their place, in a perpetual entrance and exit.

It is not easy to understand how Herbart, with such a conception of intellectual development, could

deem himself justified in holding to a belief in the existence of a soul. It is vain to say that the soul is a "monad," simple and homogeneous, superior to the myriads of monads which people the universe; this undefined being, this hypothetical substratum, appears to be a pure negation, for it has no activity of its own, possesses at most a *vis inertiae*, power to enter into relationship with the world of sense through the medium of the nervous system. The monad of Leibniz is quite a different thing: isolated, shut in, without an opening to the external world, its principle of activity is in itself. Herbart's monad as he himself defined it, "has originally no ideas, desires, or feelings. Itself knows nothing of itself, nothing of the external world. Still more, it has no forms of perception, such as Kant conceived, no laws of will or of action, no sort of predisposition remotely related, even, to all that; its nature is entirely unknown."¹ One might just as well say that it does not exist; and if Herbart grants to it a power of "conservation," in face of other monads which try to destroy it, one wants to ask him what it can have to conserve. To deny to it all preformation, to impoverish and empty it, so to speak,

¹ *Text-book of Psychology*, Part III, §§ 152, 153. In addition he says: "I would not admit any kind of germs, or any kind of natural predispositions; such predispositions are the death of psychology."

to the point of depriving it of all initial force, — does not this, in fact, amount to denying its existence?

Nevertheless, Herbart represents himself as a spiritualist; he calls materialism an “absurdity.” The soul which he has reduced to nothing, he describes as mistress of the body which she rules; and this preëminence he attributes to the place which he assigns to it in a locality of the brain: “a splendid situation where all the nerves meet and end.”

However that may be, such is the way in which Herbart reconstructs the soul and builds a scaffolding for his intellectualism on the ruins of the innate, without any primitive foundation, with nothing except the deposit of sensations; for his system might be defined as absolute intellectualism on an empirical basis. Mind, as we have said, is a vague and empty place, into which are introduced one after another different representations of the external world, “presentations” of the senses. Mind cannot be said to be conscious of these representations or ideas, since it is itself nothing but the whole group of ideas; but each is conscious of itself, and it remains so until it yields place, as it were, to other ideas. Then it falls back below what Herbart calls the “threshold of consciousness.” When they have returned to the region of shadows, all the ideas acquired form in the depths, one might say the crypt,

of the soul, as it were, an unconscious or subconscious underground region. They are not, indeed, "annihilated, nor have they disappeared forever"; they are merely latent; they continue in a condition of tendency, and they aspire to reproduce and re-instate themselves, as soon as a favourable occasion will permit this to occur. Amongst all the representative elements which have gradually enriched the mind, there is in progress a sort of struggle for consciousness, analogous to the struggle for life amongst individuals in society.

But it is not by chance or regardless of law that the ideas stored up reappear in order to again take possession of the light. There are both static and dynamic states of mind. Static, when ideas have, so to speak, fallen asleep and entered a state of rest or repose; dynamic, when circumstances set them free and recall them to conscious life. Ideas, moreover, find in themselves the power to render mutual assistance, or to struggle with each other. They are mental forces which act on each other by attraction or repulsion, though it is not easy to understand how an idea, which is only a passive representation of an external object, can become active, when there is no feeling and willing subject who communicates activity to it. But the power which Herbart has withdrawn from the soul and

the faculties he must rediscover somewhere, and he attributes it to ideas. When they are more or less alike, they tend to form groups and unite: that is what we call a "fusion." When they are merely different, unlike, they get mixed and entangled, forming a "complex." When they are contrary, and opposed to each other they cannot coexist, and they drive each other out.

The soul, then, is like the stage of a theatre on which actors come in turn to take a front place before the footlights. The first appears and stays until another, entering in his turn, either expels him by violence and throws him back behind the curtain, or tells him to stay, and, if they can find a common subject of conversation, they become friends. The soul, in other terms, is only a series of states of consciousness, a flow and ebb of ideas, which now emerge like rising stars above the horizon, now vanish into night. Ideas agree with each other or struggle together: the soul, a dumb creature, raises no objection. Hence Herbart thought that ideas might be subjected to quantitative determination; that was a chimerical notion which we may wholly reject in spite of the importance which Herbart himself may have attached to it; but when this notion is transferred from the realm of pure ideas to that of

sensations and psychological phenomena (so far as they are allied with physiological manifestations) it may lead to solid and certain results; hence we may say that Herbart, by one of his errors, even opened up the road for the fruitful researches in psychophysiology of Lotze, Fechner, Helmholtz, and Wundt.¹

Everything, then, with Herbart is reduced to psychical mechanism; "fusions" and "complexes" of representations explain all phenomena of the intellect: abstraction, judgment, comparison, reason, the notion of self, not leaving out memory and imagination. The other phenomena of the soul, sentiments, desires, volition, are adequately accounted for by the relation of ideas to each other. Sentiments are no longer elementary and primitive states, but states transitory and derived: fleeting modifications of ideas. They are the shadows that pass: the foundation of the mind remains, and this foundation consists of ideas. Education, therefore, must be constructed on ideas, and not on the shifting sands of sensation.

Sensation, — and this opinion of Herbart has maintained its prestige in the German philosophy of the nineteenth century, — sensation is only a mode,

¹ On the relation of the doctrine of Herbart to experimental psychology, see the recent work of Th. Jehen: *Das Verhältniss der Herbartischen Psychologie zur physiologisch experimentellen Psychologie*, Berlin, 1900.

a function of the intellect. Pain arises from a conflict, an antagonism of two ideas, and from the resulting state of tension. Pleasure is the consequence of the union of two ideas which are in accord. Pleasure comes from the forward movement of thought, pain from its arrest. Desire is only a strong, vivid representation, which tends to maintain itself above the "threshold of consciousness"; and, finally, volition, a special form of desire, appears when a representation which tends to reappear is assisted by other representations, and, in addition, belief that it can be realized is present.

The psychological system of Herbart, as far as one can judge from this short study, is extremely ingenious; but it is difficult to perceive in it anything but a work of his imagination. It proceeds, in fact, neither from the old method of introspective observation, the evidence for which may be sought in the testimony given by the consciousness of others (and this may or may not confirm what you believe you have discovered in your own consciousness), nor the method of modern psychology, the psychology which seeks the conditions of mental life in the study of the nervous system.

Physiologists may rightly say to Herbart: You neglect and slight the function of the brain. At least you make very rare allusions to it. You forget

that ideas are only conscious manifestations of molecular movements and vibrations of the cerebral masses. On the other hand, an objection may be raised by the spiritualists: You reduce to nothing the activity of the soul; you leave it only the function of King Log (*roi fainéant*). In ascribing to ideas alone the duty of explaining mental movement, you annihilate the thinking subject. We can see how they come one after the other, brought in by the senses; but there is no one to receive them. . . .

Herbart is wrong on both counts. He eliminates at one stroke the double framework: the brain and the general consciousness, the material substance, and the intellectual principle of psychic phenomena. If "representations" pass back and forth in the mind like marionettes on the stage of a Guignol theatre, or Chinese shadows behind a screen, that is not, as he thought, because of relationships between them. If they obey a settled order of succession, it is because they are directed by an invisible hand; that is to say, either by the brain or by the soul. Thus, as M. Fouillée has expressed it: "A cloud in the sky does not take the form of a tower because it had previously the form of a mountain, but it took the two forms successively under the action of the wind which drives it." ¹

¹ M. Fouillée, *L'évolutionnisme des idées-forces*, p. 34.

To convince oneself that the hypotheses of Herbart are false, it suffices to confront them with a few facts from experience. Let us recall, for example, any moment of our lives when we felt a keen sorrow or great joy. Immediately after this emotional disturbance, whether painful or pleasant, is it not a fact that some interior force, the emotion still thrilling us, summons incessantly to consciousness ideas which correspond to our feeling, ideas connected with sorrow or pleasure? Is it possible that the mere resemblance of these ideas, whether sad or merry, to the idea dominating our mind, explains their union? No; what proves that the force of attraction does not lie in the ideas alone, that its source must be sought where it resides, in an inner feeling, is the fact that the busiest occupations and representations quite new and unlike, of such a nature as completely to turn aside the current of thought do not hinder the wave of wretchedness or satisfaction from overtaking us again in the middle of cares of quite another kind. We may work, we may seek distraction in vain, or we may even succeed for several hours in turning our attention to objects which have no relation to the happy or unhappy event which has disturbed our life, but that does not hinder the sorrowful or joyful ideas from gaining the ascendant again at a moment when we

are thinking least about them. What can be said, except that ideas do not control themselves by virtue of their relations; that above them there is a hidden power which governs them, and which intervenes to disturb the order of their succession.

Let us consider another case, recalling an experience somewhat as follows: during hours of solitary meditation, when the senses were mute, even when we were controlling the stream of ideas with a strong hand, the thread of thought — to use Herbart's expression — was suddenly interrupted and cut short by an idea quite foreign to the matter which occupied us. An unexpected reminiscence, a landscape long ago passed from our vision, the image of some one we have not seen for years, — these come and disturb us by their sudden apparition. They come from I do not know where, and they may have no relation whatever to the reflections which are absorbing us. An internal spring is touched, a latent activity of the imagination, or modification of the cellules of the brain, and this causes a sleeping image to awaken. In any case, the logical association of ideas does not hold good here, and the theory of Herbart regarding an intrinsic interlacing, a normal union of ideas, falls once more to the ground.

But, true or false, the psychology of Herbart is the foundation of his pedagogy, and it is possible

already to discern, according to what has just been said, what will be the general characteristic features of his system of education.

In the first place, from a psychological intellectualism which explains the soul as consisting only of a series or a network of representations or ideas, arises a pedagogical intellectualism which makes instruction, that is, the acquisition of ideas, the only basis of education. Even the formation of character will depend on forming the intellect. There will be no manner of separation or scission between intellectual and moral education. The understanding will be the principle of the will, and actions will conform to ideas.

A second consequence of this psychological empiricism of Herbart is that the influence of education sets up a claim to be considered omnipotent. Since the souls of men are originally alike, it depends on education alone to form them. If there are no inborn intellectual tendencies which assist the educator, neither does the soul inherit vicious or adverse inclinations to hinder his efforts. He can write at will on the white pages of the child's understanding; on this condition, however, that the supposition in the education of the solitary *Émile* is made actual, viz., that from his infancy only one master controls the pupil. The destiny of each

individual depends on the grouping of ideas which the wisdom of his parents or the ability of his teachers has been able to bring about in his mind when a child. From this the conclusion inevitably follows that education is the mistress ruling the future of mankind; if, by a strange contradiction, Herbart had not restored to the body the innate predispositions of which he was content to rob the soul, and attribute to the organism, the physical temperament, those individual characteristics, defects, or virtues, which sometimes favour the action of education, sometimes oppose it, and thus fix in a measure the character and destiny of individuals in advance, now by over-exciting intellectual activity, now by checking it. "Bodily differences are reflected in psychical manifestations." The body is the physiological obstacle, the hereditary enemy. It is to the body that individuality belongs. In consequence, Herbart does not indulge that simple illusion that we could produce geniuses or even talented men at will. He admits that the best education sometimes fails, that great men have educated themselves, that men of moderate ability remain such, in spite of all the efforts of their masters. None the less Herbart is warranted by his system as a whole in ascribing very great influence to education. In his pedagogy, therefore, he belongs to the

believers, the men of faith. "Without the joyful hope inspired by meditating on youth, how could one overcome the benumbing impressions made by the idea that the world might remain always what it is now."

A third point, and one of the most important: there can no longer be any question about the cultivation of faculties in a system which denies that they exist. Although in current psychology "faculties" are no longer held to be anything beyond conventional terms, labels for connecting a series of phenomena, methods of education are none the less still in part adjusted to suit the old faculty theory. Hence we still witness examples of mischievous educational procedure. We speak, for example, of developing the memory as such, as if there were a memory independent of the successive ideas that enter consciousness. Regarding judgment and reason, the same is true. Who amongst us has not made sacrifice to this ancient prejudice of classic psychology? In that case it would then matter little what knowledges were used to cultivate the so-called faculties, whether or no they were interesting. Some science or other, arithmetic, for example, would be taught, not in order to know it, but to exercise the reasoning faculty. Herbart's position in this paramount and delicate question is alto-

gether different. In his opinion, the knowledges are valuable only for themselves by reason of their intrinsic utility, and not for the doubtful profit which formal culture might claim to derive from them.

It seems an argument on his side, that an aptitude acquired in one branch of knowledge does not appear applicable to studies in general, without any loss of power and with equal success, yet this should be the case if faculties really existed. Certain children have good memories at home and none at school. That would be enough to prove that there is no memory faculty applicable without distinction to all objects; that there are only groups of recollections; hence we may have acquired with ease a piece of knowledge in a certain sphere, and yet be incapable of acquiring fresh knowledge in another field. A certain study cultivates the mind in a certain direction, not in all directions.

In the same way we have known children who at twelve years of age gave clear proofs of the strength of their reasoning power in mathematical science; that was because they had just been studying mathematics. Afterwards they neglected this study. They exercised their reason in other studies, historical or philosophical, it may be, and at eighteen years of age they found it quite difficult to understand

mathematics. Herbart, then, has some reason to maintain that the general cultivation of hypothetical faculties is absurd, that the only real education is such as furnishes the intellect with positive knowledge. As an English humorist has said, "The prescription for developing digestive power is not to chew elastic rubber, it is to grow strong on good beefsteaks." In the same way intellect is cultivated, not by purely formal and empty exercises, but by solid, substantial, and nourishing instruction.

Let us note in the fourth place in Herbart's psychology an assumption of very wide bearing in pedagogy: his theory of "apperception," a term that has found favor in modern philosophy. It was not new, for Kant employed it to signify the elemental knowledge of self, anterior to all perception. Herbart, however, gave it a different meaning. His apperception must be understood as applying to sense-perception, in so far as it is made clear and complete by representations already acquired by the mind. As a matter of fact, the new expression was, perhaps, not quite necessary; the term "conception" would have sufficed, if conception is, as sometimes defined, the apprehension of an object by the intellect. You look at a rose: your senses tell you its form, colour, and convey to you its perfume. But with these simple, immediate, per-

ceptions others are united that have been formerly acquired, and which are more or less distinct: that this small round thing, red or white, is called a rose, that you have seen others similar in other gardens, etc.; this is, then, an apperception. Mr. Stout, one of the commentators of Herbart who has given an excellent exposition of his psychology,¹ has said that apperception is "the act by which a mental system appropriates a new element:" one might define it more clearly yet as the act by which ideas already acquired assimilate and incorporate a new idea. The acquired ideas, therefore, modify and alter the perception: whence it may be inferred that two persons never have an identical apperception of the same object. Above all, ideas facilitate or hinder the acquisition of knowledge: since groups of ideas previously acquired may or may not lend themselves to further acquisitions. From this way, of conceiving the mind at work acquiring knowledge, Herbart derived the inspiration of some of his methods of teaching which do the most honour to his pedagogical insight, notably as regards the necessity of rendering the mind ready to receive instruction. In order that a new representative may be received into the circle of ideas, that it may find its way with ease and security amidst the network of knowledges,

¹ See *Mind*, 1888, 1889.

the teacher, at the beginning of each lesson, must prepare the ground; he must, so to speak, summon up a mental escort into the presence of the newcomer to welcome and introduce him. In other words, the teacher must put before the child only such notions as can easily combine with those he already has, and thus form groups of ideas associated logically and united strongly; on this will depend not only wealth of mind but also strength and force of character. The old faculty psychology taught us that when pupils enter the class-room they had at their disposal an intelligence and memory quite ready to learn anything whatever. But this view is false; it is necessary to summon, to awaken and set in order, those ideas to which the topic selected for the day's lesson can be adjusted; we must eliminate and crowd out all preoccupations which might hinder the effect of the teacher's words, his instruction, from penetrating; we must thus clear the road for distinct and fruitful apperception.

If it was his own psychology which suggested to Herbart those processes in instruction which he extols, it also led to his definite conclusion regarding the preference to be given to public or to home education. He rejected the opinions of his master at Jena, the famous Fichte, as much in pedagogy as in philosophy. Fichte, having specially in view

national and civic education, sketched his plans for regiments of young men in the gymnasiums; Herbart, on the contrary, is concerned above all with the individual himself, with the man rather than with the citizen. He makes the reproach against the State as educator that it thinks only of preparing bureaucrats. Home education, if that were always possible, would be superior to all other. "That boy," said he, "is infinitely more accessible to the influences of education who has been a long time educated by one person, especially if he has had the good fortune to be educated by his mother." He was here recalling a personal experience. When a child passes from hand to hand, it is difficult for the masters who follow each other to establish authority over him. For the rest, Herbart recognized that domestic education is, as a rule, an unrealizable ideal, that the family is too much occupied otherwise to fulfil its duty in this respect, and besides it is often too noisy and gay to fulfil it well. But since parents must send away their children, let them at least be followed in thought, and never lost from view. These are truths worth recalling at a time when families abandon their children to the State more and more, and shift on to it the burden of caring for and educating their children. The great mischief of the public school, according to Herbart, is that it

collects together children who are very different, unequal morally and intellectually, for the purpose of giving them a uniform education. Even supposing that all had in the beginning the same starting-point, they have already had time when they become scholars to undergo very different impressions, whether at home or in society, and these have modified their character and intellect. Hence the inferiority of public-school education, which, bending all heads under the same yoke, cannot mete out and adapt the rules of discipline and methods of instruction to the many and various aptitudes of the scholars as would a teacher in conversation with a single child. No matter whether they are ailing or strong, it presents to them the same difficulties to conquer; whether their pace is rapid or slow, it conducts them along the same road and in the same order. The disadvantage of public instruction is still more marked when, following the theory of apperception, we consider that instruction can produce its full fruit only when the teacher knows how to impart it skilfully with all manner of precaution, adjusting it to the complex tissue of ideas which constitutes the intellect of each child.

A philosopher who, like Herbart, denies all innateness and mental heredity, would seem condemned,

in consequence, to ignore the special and individual elements in human personality. But by reason of the influence ascribed by him to the physical organism, an influence varying from one child to another, Herbart reestablishes the individuality, which his system appeared at first to compromise. To this subject he devotes long chapters. Hence he does not admit that to be an educator it is sufficient to have studied abstract psychology and its general principles. Since it is the individual that we have to educate, it is the individual that it is necessary to know. As an English humorist has said, it is not a matter of grinding in a pedagogical mortar the sixty pupils of a class of which John is a member, until they have been reduced, so to speak, to the state of a mass of uniform youth, in order to obtain the average. John is not a quotient; he is an actual individual being, who must be studied in his own character, with the virtues and faults which mark him off from all his comrades.¹

From the writings of Herbart one could gather precious contributions for the psychology of the adolescent yet to be written, and which, when once in existence, will render not less service to the art and science of education than the psychology of the little

¹ John Adams, *The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education*, London, 1898.

child. I mean a descriptive psychology, in which different temperaments will be distinguished, causes of their diversity analyzed, and then the means pointed out which should be used as remedy for the deficiencies or mental defects of youth according to the particular case. Herbart traced out the characteristic differences between children, and also those marking young men, with delicate insight. He deserves to be considered one of the forerunners of the science called "ethnology." He shows us, for example, children of a contradictory humour, "an intellect that always replies no," whom nothing suits, who mix with everything, as it were, a drop of bitterness. With these morose and peevish natures, special precautions must be taken; in order to inspire them with respect, or even fear, they should be subject to severe discipline. On the other hand, there are children who see everything rose-coloured, and Herbart considers this superficial optimism also a kind of disease which needs appropriate attention.

Herbart, like a good psychologist, had listened to doctors and health experts, and the question of physical temperament attracted and held his attention. He distinguished seven classes of temperaments — four normal, three abnormal. Here are children muscularly feeble, but with a well-shaped head and active intellect. They prefer intellectual

occupations to games and physical exercises. They are, as Plato would have said, "musicians" as opposed to "gymnasts." We must take books away from their hands, force them to play and be active. But the nature of the physical organism is not the only source of diversity of temperament. Circumstances, the conditions of education and life, may modify the primitive disposition. There are, for example, blunted temperaments which Herbart calls "Bœotians"; and this intellectual languor, this mental heaviness, is often the effect of the mode of life of the individual and of the habits he has contracted. Thus the peasant whose thoughts are imprisoned in a narrow and predetermined circle, whose imagination passes regularly from seed-time to harvest, and harvest to seed-time, he is condemned by the yoke of his monotonous life, to become in every land a "Bœotian," whatever may have been the original wealth of his temperament. In the same way a child, naturally of very sweet temperament, will become, perhaps, irritable and cross under the infliction of repeated annoyances. The most sanguine and ardent man will succumb to melancholy if he is subjected to a kind of life which undermines his natural gaiety.

But it is impossible for us to follow Herbart's footsteps along all the roads whither his observant

intelligence led him. Let it suffice to have shown the important place that his psychology holds in his system of education. Since Herbart's time, the assertion that psychology and pedagogy cannot mingle, that they are "like oil and water," is no longer admissible. Herbart employed his life and all his thinking-power to prove the contrary.]

That psychology is sufficient to prepare and form a teacher, however, cannot be said. The science of education can be the goal of nothing less than the whole range of research of the human mind. In order that pedagogy may at last leave behind the "gross empiricism" where it has so long languished, it must have recourse to all forms of knowledge; it will "erect its scaffold on a united group of all sciences." The educator will, then, be above all else a theorist—a scholar, a philosopher. Nowhere else is the necessity of having wide philosophic views and broad general ideas so imperative as in pedagogy; for the hard daily toil imposed on teachers tends to narrow their horizon.

Without theory, practice ends in routine; but on the other hand, without practice, theory may lose itself in the clouds of abstraction. There is at one and the same time a science of education and an art of education. Herbart does not separate them. No one has understood better than he the complex

and delicate conditions under which the teacher of infancy and youth is formed, what a heavy price he pays. No one has contributed more than he to discredit and destroy the traditional prejudice that the teacher is born, that a man is a professor by the grace of God. Too often it is imagined that to become a good schoolmaster it is enough to have knowledge and ability. Herbart believed, on the contrary, that skill, pedagogical efficiency, is acquired only by prolonged effort, that long practice and exercise are necessary, experience gained through failure as well as success; at the same time there must be the continuous hard work involved in a philosophic investigation of the laws of education.

"It is by meditation," said he, "it is by reflection and research, it is through scientific study, that the educator must prepare his mind and heart to fit himself to conceive, feel, and judge rightly the particular incidents, the special cases, which he must meet in his career as a teacher."

III

THE pedagogy of Herbart is a whole world of thought, and a big volume would be necessary for an analysis and exposition covering the whole ground. There is not a question, whether of pedagogical theory or practice, which he has not attacked and solved. By the side of general notions, conceptions in which he delights to revel with exceptional power, he furnishes abundant special rules. He abounds in methods, processes, devices. He is not satisfied to skim over the surface of his subject; he descends to the details of a matter with minute accuracy.

Moreover, a brief exposition of the theories of Herbart is rendered difficult by his peculiar mode of thought. Some one has said, "We cannot read Herbart, we must study him." So one might say, "We cannot make a synopsis of Herbart, we are forced to examine him thoroughly." His penetrative power makes him subtle, and at times his extreme abstraction renders him obscure. He analyzes beyond measure. His writings bristle with endless distinctions, divisions, subdivisions.

His central thought is constantly overlaid with incidental considerations which hamper and conceal it. To use his own term, he does not sufficiently sharpen "the point" of his ideas. He hardly makes any assertion without immediately gathering round it corrections and reservations. Doubtless, in the delicate matters of which he treats, these are, perhaps, ways of approximating to truth. All the same, one would like greater clearness, clearer-cut conclusions. At the beginning, the reader loses himself amid the twists and turns of his elaborated reflections. The first impression is painful, confusing, and even annoying. But provided we return to the study of the pages which at first repelled us, we become attracted, fascinated, and we begin to think we may become Herbartian. We end by moving at ease through the windings of thoughts which are endlessly complex, and of which we did not at first apprehend the strict logic. Diamonds are not less brilliant because effort must be exerted to separate them from their bed; so Herbart's ideas, some of them at least, do not appear less sound or less admirable, because they must be loosened from a somewhat rough case, and from the scholastic form in which he embodied them. Certainly in the thick growth of his theories there is more than one dead branch; but these branches may fall and yet

the trunk remain healthy and unshaken; and when one is allowed to neglect those parts of his work which to-day are of interest only from the historic and curious point of view, there yet remain enough living ideas for it to be worth while to gather and bring them to the light.

The governing idea of Herbart's pedagogy, the idea which should guide us if we wish to understand it, is that the foundation, the only foundation of the whole of education, is instruction. There exist, then, no longer two distinct educations, an intellectual and a moral education, as those necessarily were tempted to believe who acknowledged distinct faculties, and who, in consequence, had to provide for the intellect, the senses, the will, and their separate cultivation each by themselves. Above all, there is no education as distinct from instruction. No; the mental nature is a unity, and consequently there is only one education, education by instruction, or educative instruction.

We are acquainted with the new force which the word "instruction" gains in Herbart's writings. To instruct the mind is, he considers, to construct it. It is no longer a question, as under the old hypothesis of faculties bestowed by nature, of overlaying a more or less trustworthy memory, of causing literary or scientific knowledge to enter an under-

standing more or less open. Knowledge is no longer a mental ornament, it is a mental element. Knowledge builds up and produces mind. According to the old theory, since mind existed prior to experience, it conditioned the unity of consciousness. But if it is true that there is no intellect apart from successive ideas, henceforth we must seek the bonds that unite them in the cohesion, the interlacing of the ideas themselves. "Whatever is isolated," said Herbart, "is valueless." It is a consequence of this theory that instruction assumes a profound and delicate meaning, and that quite new duties are imposed on teaching; its office is no longer confined to developing the intellect, since it must create it, and since by the association of memories, by regular "series" of ideas, those mental forces are aroused whence spring not only strength of intellect, but also strength of will.

The essential condition of fruitful instruction is that it excites "interest" and attracts it. A pedagogical theorist may be allowed to be dull (and it must be acknowledged that Herbart sometimes permits himself this), but the practical teacher, the schoolmaster, commits a fatal sin if he is dull; the first duty of a teacher is to be interesting.

Interest is the watchword, the word to conjure with in Herbart's pedagogy. Just as in ethics he re-

jects the categorical imperative, and as guide for souls seeking virtue he desires to substitute for the hard law of Kant the pure but arid bond of duty, the pleasant and attractive notion of the ideal, so in pedagogy he excludes constraint, and he tones down effort almost to the degree of suppressing it. "All is lost," said he, "if from the beginning we have been clumsy enough to make study a source of misery and torment." The charm of the true, like the charm of the good and of the beautiful, this is the chief principle of education.

Interest (*die Interesse*) is the liking that we conceive for things and that causes us to take pleasure in them. To interest is to arouse the hunger of the intellect. Mark well that its aim is not to amuse or divert, and to make teaching into a play. Herbart marked himself off clearly from the educationists of his time, called "Philanthropists," who claimed to make of instruction a recreation. He will not have "soft pedagogy," or let a teacher stoop to construct an infantine world for his pupil. Interest, as he understood it, is at once the characteristic of things which captivates the attention, and a feeling of curiosity, of alertness and activity of intellect, manifested in the mind. The term interest, then, is two-faced; it belongs at the same time to the object arousing the taste and to the sub-

ject in whom the taste is aroused. It is interest which is the spring of mental activity, the principle of intellectual life. It keeps the attention of the class centred on the lips of a skilful master, and likewise fixes it and holds it to the observation of things that please them, or to carrying out attractive pieces of work to the end. The activity which Herbart denied to the soul itself, he revived under the form of interest; for interest summons up old ideas, calls for new ones, and, in short, determines the movement of the intellect.

There are, moreover, two fundamental sources of interest: first, the feeling of questioning attention provoked by experience (*Erfahrung*), by the study of nature, and by the search for knowledge; and also interest springing out of social life, the presence of human beings and communication with them (*Umgang*). Hence education, or instruction, must have a double aim: to give knowledge of things, and love of humanity. But Herbart divides only in order to subdivide; and the two forms of interest are each presented under three successive aspects.

The interest belonging to knowledge has three phases: empirical interest, speculative interest, and æsthetic interest. Empirical interest takes its rise in the direct sense-perception of things, from variety amongst the concrete objects which nature

or instruction presents to the wondering eyes of childhood. Speculative interest follows empirical: it has its source in prolonged reflection on the objects of experience, the need for an explanation of phenomena and inquiry into causes and effects. This type of interest is already manifest in the ever-recurring "why" of the child. It is the pleasure felt by the mind in understanding the reason for things, the laws of nature. To enjoy the sight of the sky studded with stars, that is empirical interest: to reflect on the origin of the stars, on the causes of their movements, that is speculative interest. Finally, æsthetic interest is fed by the contemplation of beauty in nature, in works of art, or in moral actions. To this kind of interest Herbart gave a large share of his attention. He claimed that æsthetic taste should be cultivated early, as the source of the purest joys that life reserves for mankind, that it should be cultivated in every child without exception, regardless of the social rank to which he belongs; for the day will come — and it is our duty to try to hasten that day — when the artisan will be in his own fashion an artist, and when beauty will become the charm and enchantment of existence for every one.

Turning now to the interest occasioned, not by knowledge, but by human relationships, which the child derives from his environment, his relation to

his fellows, in his family, in the school, in church, and in society, this also appears wider under three distinct aspects. In the first place, there is sympathetic interest, the interest the child feels when it takes part in the joy or grief of the people who surround him: this is developed at home, in the social life of the school. In the second place, there is social interest, an extended form of family sympathy or school comradeship; it springs from reflection on the important facts about social coöperation; it is the root of philanthropy, of all the social virtues, of what to-day we call human solidarity. Finally, religious interest is the crown, the last rung of the ladder which the human mind ascends to reach complete living, and to exercise its activity in the fullest way. Herbart, who would not have religion excluded from education, declared that the order of the world would remain unintelligible, if one did not admit that a divine spirit has presumably willed and conceived its plan, and a divine power realized it. Yet however incomprehensible and undefinable, God appears to Herbart as "the father of mankind"; and it is as a feeling of filial respect that the first elements of religious humility, of divine veneration and adoration, germinate in the child's heart. "God is thought of by the child as the father of his father and mother."

Not one of the six forms of interest just enumerated may be neglected. In schools of the lowest as well as of the highest rank, all these sources of mental activity must be either simultaneously or successively drawn upon; each must gush forth in a stream of ideas that the soul may be filled. Interest is, in all kinds of study, a necessary condition of mental fruitfulness and profit; and manifold interest, — “a many-sided interest” (*Vielseitigkeit des Interesse*), — is not less demanded, in order that education may reach its end and correspond with the high calling of man. What Herbart requires, is that minds should be broad and wide, awake to everything, active in every direction, that the intellect should have, so to speak, “many sides,” and should, in consequence, escape exclusiveness, the great stumbling-block to a complete plan of education.

This exclusiveness, in other terms narrow-mindedness, is the inevitable consequence of education when it develops only one type of interest. It is evident, for example, that a mind will remain imperfect and limited if it is confined to speculative or religious interest without room being made for sympathetic interest. The understanding will then be hard, and the soul without heart. Hence how often must we acknowledge a kind of insensibility regarding affairs of the world in men whose religious devotion

leads to asceticism, or in scholars who let themselves be entirely occupied in meditation, and who spare no glances for what is passing around them. On the other hand, the exigencies of practical life too often lead men to shut themselves up in their profession or trade: a grave error; a profession should not isolate a man. However much a man's own occupations may play the tyrant over him, he should not remain unconcerned and a stranger to the occupations of others. His interest should extend to the labours of all his fellows. When an individual wraps himself up in himself, a frost penetrates his egoistic soul; it then warms itself only at one hearth, that of personal well-being. The true destiny of each man is to take interest in everything human, and, so to speak, to bear and to honour all humanity in himself.

Further, the mischievous effect of exclusiveness does not emanate only from the fact that some of the six forms of interest are sacrificed in order that the man may devote himself entirely to the others. Each of them tends to develop special tastes in its own domain, and these lead to intellectual or moral excesses, against which education cannot strive too strongly. Thus it may happen that empirical, or speculative, or æsthetic interest may be centred on one favourite study, and this causes all others to be

neglected; one may wish to be only a botanist or zoölogist, a mathematician, a metaphysician, painter, or musician. Sympathetic interest, in the same way, may unite the child only to his parents, or to his school or comrades. In the same way, again, social interest may fall into regrettable exclusiveness, when it inspires passionate attachment to any special political party, to which the man is given up to such a degree that he measures everything by its value to the party. Finally, even religious interest has a tendency also to mutilate the soul, when it induces a believer in religion to despise, and even perhaps to hate, all those who do not think with him, and who belong to other faiths.

Many-sided interest, then, is the safeguard of a broad, well-balanced education, the only kind which can guarantee fulness of mind and heart. It is true that if wide interests save and preserve the soul from partiality and narrowness, they expose it to another danger, that of enfeebling it by dispersion. Wealth may result in weakness: the calyx of a flower is broken by trying to enlarge it too much. But Herbart thinks it will be possible to steer clear of this rock, if, through an equal division of the different interests, balance is maintained, and if we can unify the subjects by coördinating them and strictly systematizing them.

It must be acknowledged that Herbart's goal is very high. What more desirable, if it were possible, than to call upon all men to slake their thirst at every source of interest, that is to say, to profit by all forms of instruction, all the subjects taught? But how could one single man accomplish a task so immense? Herbart has sketched his fascinating picture not from the individual, but from humanity as a whole, from its collective activity exerted in various directions. In practical life time passes too rapidly, school life is too short, professional necessities too urgent, to entirely escape inevitable specialization and limitation, and to indulge the hope that in the education of the individual we may reach such a universality of interests and tastes as would be perfection; this remains unhappily an inaccessible ideal.

However that may be, interest, wherever it can serve as agent in exciting mental activity, is subject to certain delicate conditions which it is important for us to analyze. Herbart proposes, first of all, a new distinction, and a very true one. There is a "direct," and an "indirect" interest. Only the first is really fruitful. Indirect interest, which we impose on the child through praise and blame, through exhortation and threats, through hope of reward and fear of punishment, just because it is commanded and imposed, leaves the mind in a

relatively passive condition. It necessitates an effort, sometimes a painful effort, and Herbart dislikes effort. It corresponds to the kind of attention which he improperly calls *voluntary* (artificial would be a more correct designation), and which, in his opinion, is not the best. "In the case of children, the desire to be attentive is uncertain and wavering, and in the effort which they make to maintain it, they expend part of their strength, thus injuring the smoothness and clearness of their perceptions." We must not have recourse to indirect interest, except when it is impossible to do otherwise, for example, in oral lessons and in memory exercises, which have no attraction in themselves, but are, nevertheless, indispensable; for Herbart rightly considers that in every study some parts must be learnt by heart.

Direct interest is the true interest; it springs spontaneously from the things themselves, from the knowledge which the child gathers from his daily experience at home and in school, and from interest which wells up naturally from pleasant sensations and skilled instruction; these captivate the mind and hold it prisoner, while at the same time they arouse, inspire, and quicken it.

With this direct interest is united voluntary attention, which at bottom is nothing but curiosity:

the need of understanding, the desire to see and know. Only, in the theory of Herbart, curiosity, which the old psychology considered an instinct of the intellect aspiring spontaneously after knowledge, becomes merely the result of interest. We may, indeed, say that it is no longer quite spontaneous, it is aroused.

Herbart has thrown the most vivid light on the doctrine of attention. On the whole, he is in agreement with modern psychologists, who, like Ribot, maintain that the cause of attention is always some emotional condition. Interest, in fact, which keeps the mind alert, must be regarded as an emotional condition, since it provides pleasure and renders study agreeable.

But this involuntary and natural attention, which Ribot says is "the true and fundamental form of attention,"¹ may, according to Herbart, cover two distinct forms: it is either "primitive" or "apperceptive."

Primitive attention depends on the strength of sensations. The mind becomes the immediate prey, as it were, of vivid sense impressions. Hence Herbart, following Pestalozzi, accords a large place to intuition, that is to say, to the direct perception of sounds, colours, forms. The presentation of the

¹ Ribot, *The Psychology of Attention*, p. 3.

objects themselves is worth more than an image representing them, because it strikes and stirs the mind to a greater degree by conquering the attention; and the image is worth more, in its turn, than a verbal description.

But in instruction the principal rôle is played by involuntary attention of the second degree, by apperceptive attention. This theory of apperception is the most interesting innovation in Herbart's psychology, and the application he has made of it in education is the luminous point in his pedagogy. Apperceptive attention has its origin not in the excitement caused by sensations emanating from the outside, but from representations previously acquired, these being aroused by the approach of a new representation which has points of contact and attachment with the former. Existing ideas, asleep in the soul, mount guard, as it were, around consciousness, ready on the one hand to repulse ideas which do not meet with approval, or at least to let them pass by with indifference; on the other hand, disposed to welcome those which appear as friends, bearing marks, so to say, which will render intimacy and union easy. Ideas already assimilated by the mind prepare for new assimilations. Like so many magnetized points they attract those ideas which ask to enter consciousness,

making it a condition that there shall be affinity between what is already known and what is going to be learnt.

This way of viewing mental progress and the increase of knowledge is big with pedagogical consequences. Apperceptive attention should be active during the whole period of study. It illuminates every part of instruction. Interest will favour it and come to its assistance; it is from the theory of apperception, combined with that of interest, that Herbart evolves the greater part of his methods of instruction.

Thus, his first recommendation is that the teacher should not present to the child anything quite new to him. We must not teach *ex abrupto*. There must always be connective links and relations between what one is now teaching and what has been previously taught. New impressions, suddenly made, create intellectual disturbance, produce violent sensations of shock. The links of consciousness are, in consequence, broken, the movement of mind checked. There is no true instruction except when a new notion is introduced exactly in its right place in the series of notions already fixed, when it forms one of the loops in the tissue, one of the rings in the chain. A mind cannot be discerned at all amid a mere collection of fragmentary

pieces of knowledge, a heap of stones placed haphazard one upon another. Mind derives its substance only from the coherence of the ideas it contains; it is like a mosaic, of which all the little stones are closely adjusted and tightly compacted together to form a complete structure.

Since old knowledge must blaze the pathways for new knowledge, the point of departure for regular instruction is none other than the personal experience of the child: all that he has learnt by himself, at home or at school, in his walks or play. School lessons only intervene to supply the gaps in this slender and limited experience; this it is which supplies the true starting-point for the teacher's efforts. Knowledge of nature and of humanity began for the child in his first manifestations of interest, empirical interest and sympathetic interest; and it is by utilizing the beginnings of self-instruction that the teacher will succeed in inspiring a taste for the sciences, in insuring a full instruction, a many-sided and harmonious culture: on the one hand, those natural sciences with which Herbart associated mathematics, and on the other, the sciences of humanity, history, languages, and literature.

When once school studies have begun, many precautions should be taken to facilitate the play of apperceptive attention and to sustain interest. The

general rule, which Herbart holds to be the chief rule, is that the teacher, before beginning to instruct, should busy himself with placing the minds of his pupils within the circle of ideas related to the special subject in hand. The pupils come to the class in a mood of indifference or mental distraction. They are no longer thinking of the studies of yesterday; they have forgotten them. At home and in the street they have been thinking of other things, and during their recreation their minds have been wandering. It is, then, necessary to bring them back to the line of thought, to prepare them to profit by the lesson. Their intellect is not like a clean slate upon which chalk will write any expressions whatever without difficulty. In the first place, let all ideas, all preoccupations, be excluded from their minds which might bar the way to the knowledge which we are going to put before them. And next, let us awaken those ideas which, since they are related to the approaching lesson, will render a comprehension of it more sure and easy. Representations which are asleep in the mind are like the force which sleeps in an electric current: turn a button, and light leaps forth. But to cause light to spring forth in the intellect, that is to say, to awaken interest and fix attention, is not so simple an operation. The teacher will have recourse

to various expedients. In the first place, he will take care that the topic which he selects is connected with those that he has treated previously. It would be dangerous to jump suddenly from one subject to another. Concepts that have taken possession of the soul do not willingly yield their place to intruders. In the next place, in order that the connection which exists amongst the subjects studied may be established also in the mind that studies them, the master will take pains from the very beginning of to-day's lesson to recall the ideas presented in yesterday's lesson. He will announce and briefly outline beforehand what is going to be said, and also what is going to be read. Then, thanks to all these precautions, and above all, if he knows how to express himself simply and vividly, as Herbart counsels, in popular language, avoiding the use of too many new and technical words, he will succeed in arousing curiosity and a kind of expectation. Thus the intellect of the pupil, inclined in the right direction, will be disposed to listen, and the instruction, falling on to a well-prepared soil, will bear the fruit which he expected.

The above are, however, only the preliminary steps in the scientific (too scientific) system of didactics expounded by Herbart. On the "moments" and "modes" of instruction, on the order of the studies,

he held views that are extremely complicated; nevertheless, of these we must try to give some notion. Seeing that these courses of instruction are now a hundred years old, they consist, no doubt, largely of lifeless abstractions, of empty generalizations, set forth with minute but fruitless attention to order. Yet sometimes, when you have cracked the shell of the almond and taken away its rough envelope, you find solid and palatable fruit, on which you feast with pleasure.

According to Herbart, there are four moments or steps to pass in instruction. Since he himself felt that the distinction he draws is not very clear, he varies and multiplies expressions to distinguish these stages, without finding possible fitting and exact terminology. Thus, for instance, he says that the four stages of instruction are *clearness*, *association*, *systematization*, and *method*. Elsewhere, translating his thoughts into other terms, he proves that teaching should successively *show*, *associate*, *teach*, and *philosophize*. Some of Herbart's disciples, little satisfied with this terminology, in their turn hold that distinction must be made between *intuition*, *comparison*, *abstraction* or *generalization*, and finally, *application*.

From another aspect, to complete the description of Herbart's scheme-table, if there are four moments or

periods in instruction, there are three modes, or three methods, to be used, more or less, during each of the four moments of instruction; viz., *descriptive* method, *analytic* method, and finally, *synthetic* method.

Let us say it at once: the mistake of Herbart, as of all philosophers who carry abstraction too far, is to desire to subject the differences amongst real things to an arbitrary and fictitious unity, and in consequence to establish amongst studies an inflexible and unbending order. Is it quite certain, as Herbart believed, that all branches of instruction, — instruction consisting of concrete facts, such as natural history and geography, instruction by reasoning, such as geometry and algebra, — lend themselves to a uniform and unvarying treatment? How can the course of instruction be always the same, when the roads to be pursued are so different? Since, for the construction of the sciences there are profoundly distinct methods, how can there be only one for instruction in them? Herbart, like Pestalozzi, “mechanics” instruction. He plans the order of lesson-giving on an invariable pattern; and by dint of commands, prescriptions, regulations, he runs the risk of compromising the originality of the teacher and the spontaneity of the scholar, of suppressing, in short, life and liberty in instruction.

1. On certain points, however, it is impossible not

to agree with Herbart; for example, in regard to what concerns the first step in instruction, — clearness. We must comprehend in that all the light that a direct view, — “intuition,” in a word, — throws on a subject. Intuition is the prelude necessary for every study, and Herbart speaks of it with enthusiasm. Intuition, he says, opens before the child’s eyes large and vast spaces: his gaze, when it has recovered from its first surprise, distinguishes, analyzes, associates, is active in every way; then it stops, it rests, and then begins again. Touch, and the other senses now act in their turn. Sensations are multiplied, ideas come in a crowd, experiences begin and bring new thoughts: “Everywhere there is life, life full and free, everywhere delight in beholding the multitude of scenes which are unfolding themselves before the child.”

But to the free intuition of the earliest years should succeed the intuition, so to speak, of the learner, the intuition provoked by the teacher. Thus, in teaching history, we shall make use of every means for representing to the eyes by way of sensation the things belonging to the past: portraits of great men, images, and pictures, walks through museums, visits to monuments, to ruins of ancient castles, not forgetting the reading of works contemporaneous with the epoch studied, especially poems,

for these illuminate the bald narrative of facts. In geography, the district where teacher and scholar reside, and the surrounding neighborhood, will be the point of departure, and from this, little by little, the horizon of the imagination will stretch right across the world. In physics, before any direct teaching, we must cause the children to observe the simplest of the natural phenomena; we shall point out to them mills and the movements of the clock; we shall give them electric toys. In natural science we shall accustom them to make collections of plants and insects; if they cannot see the animals themselves, we shall put into their hands books with pictures representing the zoölogical types; before talking of the tiger, we shall make them recall what they know of the cat. There is no science, not even the science of mathematics, in which this intuitive initiation is not both necessary and possible: we shall let the children practise measuring distances, counting objects; in geometry, we shall develop their imagination by constructive plays. And this preparation through the senses for abstract reasoning in the future will begin very early. Herbart required that even in the child's cradle, different models of triangles ¹ should be put before his eyes, the form

¹ Herbart substituted the triangle for Pestalozzi's square, as elementary geometric form.

being made with brightly shining nails, which would attract and fix his gaze.

It was perhaps superfluous after Pestalozzi, it certainly is so after Herbart, to recommend intuition and object-lessons. But Herbart has this special merit, that he sets forth clearly in detail every question which he examines; he specifies everything with remarkable exactitude. At this point, for instance, he takes pains to observe that on the one hand, immediate intuition is always cut short in some direction or other, since it is confined within the limits of time and space; it must, therefore, be completed by *description*;—and, on the other hand, intuition is always complex, the object being composed of different elements; it must, then, be rendered clear and simple by *analysis*.

Herbart attaches great significance to the method of description. When the child has seen all that he can see, it is necessary for the teacher to enlarge the circle of his ideas by relating to him historical events, by talking to him of regions which he cannot explore; he must extend the child's experience, in space by descriptions, in time by narrations. Herbart far prefers oral exposition to the narrations and written descriptions that abound in books, provided that the teacher can manifest some skill in speech. In order that the description of a coun-

try, the recital of an event, should interest and lay hold of the mind, the teacher must know how to put colour and life into it; to do this he must borrow analogies and comparisons from objects known and already familiar to the child. Intuitive elements should mingle, as far as it is possible, continually in instruction. We should be careful to arrange for an association and easy union between what is recounted or described and the facts of experience. For example, in history lessons, we should not carry the imagination back to a far-distant past all in a trice; we should cause it to ascend gradually to events that happened not very long ago, by following the life-thread of aged people who surround the child. A historical description, well-narrated, should cause, in a way, an illusion of present time; we must lead the pupil to imagine that he really sees, that he has before his eyes, the people and the events about which we are talking to him.

Analysis, like description, is a mode of teaching, and one cannot do without it even during the first period of instruction. It is necessary for the purpose of disentangling the confused mass or, so to speak, the chaos of intuitions which the child has accumulated. However clear and captivating these intuitions as a matter of fact may be, they are never absolutely simple; complex and entangled, they

have invaded in confusion the mind of the child, who sees and looks, but does not know how to observe. If impressions arising from the free experience of the child have the advantage of being personal and vivid, they have the defect of following one another without order, of being mixed up, confused one with another; they float in the mind at haphazard, without logical connection. It is the province of analytic instruction to remedy this twofold mischief. In the first place, it is analysis which will distinguish and arrange diverse intuitions by singling out the objects from which they have been derived; which will help the child to make, so to speak, an inventory of his intuitive knowledge of the wealth which he has thus far appropriated. In the second place, analysis will decompose each intuition; it will make out a list of its elements, and will enumerate the qualities even of these elements, such as number and form. Analytic instruction is then, as it were, the first step of instruction; it should precede every exposition of a didactic nature. The teacher intervenes then only with a view to leading his pupil to see himself in his own experiences; the inverse of what takes place in synthetic instruction, here the teacher transmits knowledge which transcends the scholar's own experience, either in the world of nature or in the life of mankind. Let us

add that analysis has to play more than one rôle in order to unravel the bundle of primary intuitions; it will be found useful and necessary during all the steps of instruction. However different it is from synthesis, neither mode of instruction should exclude the other; the two should always be associated.

2. The second "moment" of instruction is that of association, work in comparing which leads the student to apprehend relations between intuitions. These are, henceforth, numerous and wide, thanks to experiences which have been extended by descriptions; and thanks to analysis they are clearly defined. The ground is thus well prepared for the ascent to general ideas; these become detached as isolated notions approach each other. Pestalozzi was little but a "man of intuitions," incapable of generalizing with exactitude. Herbart, on the contrary, said of himself that he was "a man of concepts"; that is to say, of general notions. And all instruction worthy of the name presupposes this ascent of the intellect from the particular to the general, from intuition to concept. Thought, indeed, has no real existence, so long as it is limited to gathering particular notions; it must lead to the conception of rules, laws, principles. Kant had already said, "Concepts without percepts are empty, but percepts without concepts are blind."

In every concrete reality there is embodied an abstract notion which must be disengaged, the universal and essential must be extracted from the unity of individual things. The second effort of instruction must aim at forming such concepts, and here again it will not be a question of formal instruction. The best method is that of conversation and interrogation. The child will be practised in finding similarities and relations, amongst the notions which he possesses, for himself. If he makes a mistake, and if he lets himself be deceived by relations more apparent than real, he must be set right. It is in the act of guiding him that we shall lead him gradually to conceive for himself abstract and general ideas.

3. It is more troublesome to render an account of the third step in instruction, the step described as systematization. It would seem, however, that Herbart means by that a systematic exposition given by the teacher. Here the synthetic method at last appears. Until now the master has kept the pupil contributing, and has confined himself to guiding him in his business of analysis and generalization, while teaching him how to develop and define what was already in his mind. Now he expounds at greater length; he teaches what the pupil could not discover for himself. And how much wise, practical

advice might we gather from the works of Herbart on this part of instruction, if space permitted ! For example, he puts the teacher of history on his guard against an error common amongst beginners, of being "diffuse," of losing himself amongst details. In geography he requires an exposition of facts after the manner of travellers, that is to say, in exact and vivid language. From all teachers, in short, he asks vivid and attractive instruction. Whatever may be his confidence, a confidence somewhat bigoted in the mechanical efficiency, so to speak, of the methods he suggests, he upholds the personal qualities of the teacher ; he requires of him talent, that he be a good speaker. He knows how deadly is the abuse of a dogmatic instruction which fetters the activity and initiative of the child. Such instruction he compares most ingeniously to a long, fine, and flexible thread, which is broken by the striking of the clock at school, and knotted together again when the clock strikes afresh ; which, unwinding slowly year by year, fastens and binds the child, without leaving him either freedom of movement or repose of mind. Moreover, synthetic instruction must be employed with discretion, and it must be made living and fruitful by constant return to perception, to experience. "To desire to shut out experience and social life, in order to confine the child in a class-

room, condemning him to find instruction from books alone, or from the dull lessons of a master, this," said Herbart forcibly, "is to affirm that one can do without the bright light of the day and be satisfied with the feeble glimmer of a candle."

4. The four moments of instruction overlap and complete each other. The last is the inverse of the first three, which had the common feature of preparing for and developing theoretic instruction; it brings us back to practice. For the rest, one cannot see why, in the strange terminology of Herbart, the word "method," or the term "to philosophize," is introduced into the business at all.¹ The last stage is, in fact, only an affair of application or of practical exercises. The teacher has finished his lesson, he is silent. It now behooves the pupil to again do something, to show by his personal work that he has profited by the instruction which he has received, that he can move at ease amongst the notions now acquired, that he can handle them successfully, that he is ready to use them profitably. He will show this in reviewing them, in original compositions, in the solution of problems, or in various

¹ It is true that Herbartians sometimes interpret this fourth operation in a sense which may justify the expression "to philosophize"; it then consists in uniting the particular subject of the lesson to the general system, and to the whole circle of knowledge of the same kind.

kinds of written exercise. Here, as always, uniting his theory with advice regarding technical details, Herbart tells us that written exercises should not be too long, too easy, or too difficult; that we must not impose on our pupils too heavy tasks to be done at home; that compositions will be of service only if they are based "on a rich store of exact ideas," which have already been placed at the pupil's disposal.

But let us stop before we exhaust the subject. We have said enough to make both the virtues and defects of the pedagogy of Herbart plain before all eyes. We cannot deny to him the merit of having constructed a complete system, with well planned relationships, admirably symmetrical, with its parts so dovetailed that no gaps appear. We certainly do not do justice to this vast conceptual whole when we limit ourselves to presenting in a short and dry review only the skeleton of a mighty and very active organism. To appreciate Herbart's pedagogy according to its merits, it is necessary to turn to the original sources. But we must yet recognize that Herbart, in his laborious effort, has sometimes taken great pains to say over again in systematic form truths known to all the world. It will be readily granted that in his pedagogy there are superfluous arguments and a measure of artificiality.

How can we resign ourselves to thinking that such a complicated method, such rigorous regulations, are the last word in the art of educating human beings, that the mind must be enmeshed by the inflexible threadwork of the manifold operations of the four "moments" of instruction, and that, in a word, education must cost all this? Is it not possible that Herbart has confused the course of instruction with the evolution of science? Science, indeed, takes its rise in experience, advances next to general laws, and finally coördinates its generalizations in a system embracing all science. But to form and instruct a mind, is that necessary which builds science? Notice besides that according to Herbart the four periods of instruction ought to reappear invariably in every study. What! even in reading and writing? In each of his lessons, and within the time-limit of class instruction, the teacher must pass always through four successive series of exercises.¹ That is absolutely impossible.

¹ In one of the very interesting discussions conducted by Professor Chabot with the pupils of the normal schools of Lyons, we made notes of a lesson-plan prepared according to Herbartian method: *Subject of the lesson*, "Courage": (1) First stage of instruction, clear ideas or perceptions: an act of courage by a pupil of the school or an inhabitant of the town, who, for example, has thrown himself into the water to effect a rescue, who has stopped a horse, etc. (2) Second "moment," comparison: other courageous acts will be put side by side before the mental vision of the pupils

We have not said all, far from it, nor have we pointed out all the refinements in the pedagogical instruments of Herbart. We have not spoken of "reflection" nor of "concentration," two operations of the mind which he expressly distinguishes: *concentration* (*Vertiefung*), of which the disciples of Herbart make great use, consists in uniting all subordinate ideas to one chief idea; for instance, grouping all the events of an epoch around one great historical name; *reflection* (*Besinnung*), calling forth again ideas already imprisoned in consciousness; nor of ideas "called forth" nor of "spontaneous" ideas, the former demanding an effort, and appearing chiefly during lessons, the latter being freely self-aroused in consciousness; nor yet of syntheses that unite, and syntheses that construct. . . . We should never end. Herbart is the father of that heavy and pedantic methodizing which has caused

with this particular act, acts of which they have heard reports, those of soldiers on the battle-field, firemen at a fire, doctors in an epidemic, etc. (3) Third "moment," system: courage in general is defined. (4) Fourth "moment," method or "philosophizing": courage, the particular virtue, is united with the whole group of virtues; or, if the other interpretation of the fourth stage of instruction, as marked by Herbart, is adopted, the pupil will be asked how, in such or such a given circumstance, he himself would show his courage.— See, also, in the *Revue pédagogique* of June 15, 1903, an article in which M. Chabot explains the manner in which M. de Sallwürk applies Herbart's method in a liberal spirit.

the production of so many big, useless, and fruitless volumes.

But, to compensate, how many useful researches has he not inspired? He has forced a legion of disciples to reflect; some are fervent and docile, others are independent, and in their turn innovators. If he has not succeeded in establishing a definite system of instruction, he has at least proved the need of one. If he has applied and misapplied the ideas of connectedness and unity, that was not in order to establish mechanical teaching; it was, on the contrary, to penetrate to that well of life, interest, — interest which can be maintained only by connectedness of ideas. Advance in instruction, indeed, is measured by this: that new ideas penetrate deeply into the mass of already existing ideas. Thus, although girt about, as it were, with a formidable armour of logic, the theory of Herbart is simple, wise, and well-balanced. He is, more than all else, a man of a free spirit, who, within the rigid lines of his method, desires to introduce life and movement. Was it not he who said that a man could work serviceably in the education of others only on condition of working at the same time at his own education? He desires young and enthusiastic educators. Away with melancholy and morose dispositions. Education is not the business of such men.

Herbart would have been unfaithful to his principles, and to the idea of "manifold interests," if he had narrowed the field of studies open to the child. He did not discuss, like Herbert Spencer, the question of finding out "which kind of knowledge is the most worth." He did not ask it, because he admits that all are necessary to form a complete man. He is already on the side of the theory of an all-round education. And as well as seeing in this universality of studies the condition of mental equilibrium, he has yet another reason for recommending it, one of the gravest reasons: education has no right to hinder or limit in advance a man's future activity, and in consequence to narrow the attention of a child by keeping it on special studies.

Shall we object that the intelligence of all pupils does not lend itself equally well to all kinds of instruction? No; for Herbart considers that no study is above the reach of children, if one knows how to choose the opportune moment for beginning it, if one takes care to begin early, to present it skilfully, according to the law of evolution natural to the mind. It is an illusion to believe, for instance, that mathematical aptitude is naturally more rare than any other. It is so, in fact, because preparatory elementary work has been too much delayed and neglected.

Every subject, then, should be taught, as Comenius already desired, and all subjects to all children in all schools. The same subjects for instruction will appear on the programme — except Latin and Greek — in primary schools as in the schools for secondary instruction. There should be no difference in the nature of the studies from one grade to another of education; that should occur only in their proportion. The same things should be taught everywhere, but in the school only the surface be skimmed; in the gymnasium (grammar or high school) the depths should be sounded.

The concrete, positive sciences, — *realien*, the Germans call them, — the humanities, equally with the natural sciences, are the basis of instruction. The study of ancient languages is not an essential element. Herbart certainly was a lover of Greek; it is known that he put the *Odyssey* into the hands of children at ten years of age, that he used it as a first reading book, and that he did not believe that there was a better means of forming the mind than to continue this study for ten months or more.¹ He liked Latin less, the writers of Rome not being suitable, in his opinion, to initiate the child into the classic ages. This initiation into classic ages weighed

¹ "It took us a year and a half to read the *Odyssey*." See the reports to M. de Steiger, 1797-1798.

with him far more than a philological study of dead languages: "Latin and Greek," he said, "a source of torment for pupils, a necessary evil in secondary schools now, ought to disappear entirely from the curriculum of the schools, if we could acquire without knowing these languages an exact view, a living representation, of antiquity." Without doubt, the classic writings are the immortal models of beauty, purity, and style, and the progress or decadence of modern languages is linked with the maintenance or suppression of the study of ancient languages. But Herbart at the same time called attention to the fact that this is not the business of the school, that it does not fall to most men to look after the fate of their language, and that the aim of school studies is only to attend to the function of literature.

Greco-Latin studies will be, then, in the future, only the favourite task of a few privileged educators. "Let us put aside the superstitious belief that to be really cultivated a modern man must be able to decipher Greek and Latin texts." The labour required by such study is rewarded for its pains only in the case of those who have a marked aptitude and a firm intention of reaching a high degree of culture. "Also, it is necessary to begin this labour early, at seven or eight years of age, before the circle of ideas closes." Languages, ancient or

modern, all systems of symbols, are a burden in teaching; we should endeavour to lighten it by interest in the things which the signs represent. Greek should be studied before Latin,—an application of the principle that pedagogical evolution should correspond to the historical. For the same reason, modern languages will not be learnt before ancient: “this would be to put the cart before the horse.” The study of texts should be connected with the study of ancient history; this is the only possible basis for a really pedagogical study of Latin and Greek,—an application of the principle of connectedness amongst ideas. And thus the old humanities, subjects which are not necessary to every one, but which will remain the ideal of a few, should be given their right place. No one has felt more fully the value of classic culture than he who, with deep insight, said: “Who, then, has really received classic culture? Only those who praise it. . . . For it could not be granted that those who malign classic culture can claim to have received it.”

IV

"THE worth of a man," said Herbart, "is measured not by what he knows, but what he desires to do." That is the same as saying that moral culture, culture that forms the will, is still more important than intellectual culture, the source of knowledge. Instruction is of value only when it tends to moral ends. The moral idea ought to dominate all instruction. Virtue is the supreme end of education.

Now, in the system of Herbart, instruction and education are found commingled, united in one. Will depends on knowledge. If each act of the will is only an idea in action, an idea energized (*idée-force*) according to the expression dear to M. Fouillée, moral character itself is only a collection, a grouping, of ideas that tend to become active. Whoever forms enlightened men, forms at the same time moral and virtuous men. Thinking rightly is the source of willing and acting rightly.

Moral culture does not the less lay claim to special attention, and Herbart has considered it apart in a series of chapters in which he scatters

delicate observations and judicious counsel from full hands. Herbart, who had a blind faith in his theories and systematic notions, is most valued by us for detail in special subjects and wealth of practical observations. In trying to summarize his views, we are liable to distort them. We ought to be able to cite these pages, so profoundly thought out in their entirety; for in them the question of moral education is discussed in all its heights and depths; and the goodness of heart of a talented thinker is revealed with a sweet seriousness.

Moral as well as intellectual culture has its point of departure in the experience of the child. Herbart, without doubt, has no wish for the "natural man" of Rousseau's type. He makes the just observation that the word "nature" is vague and equivocal, since both stoics and epicureans could appeal to it in theories of morals quite opposed to each other. But he still less desires a "school man," one who has had no contact with moral realities, who has not steeped his soul in the relations of social life. "The world and nature do much more for the pupil than education, properly so called." The moral experiences of the child, like his intellectual experience, is narrow and limited. The relations that he can establish within the circle of his family or the school are necessarily inadequate; they dispose him to

develop only one sentiment, to the exclusion of all others, love of family at the expense of love of country, or the latter at the expense of love of humanity. It is indispensable, then, that instruction should widen the field of experience, and that a "many-sided interest" should help to enlarge the heart, fight the tendency toward social exclusiveness, and form a full and complete soul. And again, this is also necessary to correct the bad effects of experience, to provide a remedy for the egoistic feelings, antipathies, aversions, which may be bred by the chances of life in school and family, for the scars and bruises, caused not seldom by the earliest relations of the child with its parents or tyrannical masters, and which hinder the upspringing of sympathetic interest.

But before moral culture can begin with advantage, there is a preparatory and provisional period, that of the "control of children" (*Regierung der Kinder*), of what is called by us discipline.¹ Formerly, discipline might have been considered as the whole law of education, in days when teachers believed they had only to oppress and constrain dispositions rebellious and wholly bad. Herbart, who considers that wickedness in children proceeds

¹ Let us note that Herbart reserves the word "discipline" (*Zucht*) to designate "moral culture."

for the most part from defects in parents, and who aspires to form an inner man capable of self-government, permits discipline and coercive measures only during early years. It should last only for a season, and should give place as soon as possible to real education, for which it should, moreover, prepare. Its end is to maintain provisional order. It prevents the child from injuring itself, and from being unbearable to others. It imposes passive submission while awaiting the birth of the will. It is necessary because of the petulance and lack of reflection of young children. It renders the first instruction possible; for one cannot instruct in-subordinate and undisciplined children. It works for the present; education works for the future.

The discipline recommended by Herbart is in no way severe or oppressive. It is at the outset steeped in the liberal spirit that will animate education. Herbart, we may be certain, was a kind, sweet-tempered, and patient genius. If he consents to authorize threats, watching, punishment, he introduces into the application of these disciplinary agencies all kinds of restrictions, which soften their severity and guard the spontaneity of the child. Upon occasion, however, he can advise vigorous though not angry repression, when, for instance, it is a question of falsehood, of which he had a horror.

Threats, — he recognized that they are often ineffective, even when they are regularly followed by deeds, and parents or masters do not, before the tears or entreaties of the child, weakly retract them. And above all, he desires that refusals and prohibitions be reduced to a strict minimum. They should leave a free field for the need of activity in the child, on every occasion when no danger is incurred by giving him a loose rein.

Superintendence, — he permits that, too, but with all sorts of restrictions. At the bottom he dislikes it. "I dare hardly say what I think about it." He will have no companion, no severe tutor who follows the child step by step, who holds him like a slave by a chain, who robs the child of all liberty by sacrificing to him his own. Excess of superintendence has, besides, this drawback, — that it stimulates the child to employ trickery and subterfuge. He recalled that during the years of his own tutorship he had been merely the guide and benevolent friend to his pupils, that he had placed confidence in them, and never hesitated to leave them to themselves, to their games and sports. "Children," he said, "must be exposed to danger, if one wants them to become men." Those who grow up under the tyranny of a superintendence that is strict, constant, and indiscreet, will possess neither courage nor self-

reliance. They will lack spirit and initiative. The strong, firm character which we should develop, and the formation of which is the essential end of moral culture, is prepared only by action, by exercise of the will. Discipline, then, must not make an improper use of police-like superintendence; it must be prudent, do nothing which will hinder the earliest manifestations of the will, and finally, while governing the child, it must prepare him to govern himself.

Punishments,—Herbart thinks them necessary. But he distinguishes between several kinds: those which are the instruments of government, others which are of use still after a liberal education has begun. There are, in the first place, disciplinary punishments, those which insure order, which oblige children to remain quiet: all sorts of privations, privations of food, liberty, and even corporal chastisement. The Germans have never had much delicacy about this matter, and Herbart does not absolutely reject the old customs. The rod and hands tied behind the back do not shock him. "It is not bad for a child to recall that he was whipped when little." But to purely disciplinary corrections should follow those which have educative virtue, and which will render the child prudent by habituating him to calculate the consequences of his

acts. These are the punishments which Herbart calls "pedagogic"; and it is worth noting that the famous theory of Herbert Spencer on natural punishment, the consequences and reactions of our acts, exists already in germ in the writings of Herbart.¹ The gormand who has eaten too many dainties should take a bitter medicine to cure his indigestion. The neglectful child who has soiled his Sunday garments should be obliged to do without them. . . . There is, finally, a third and higher kind of punishment, in which a moral idea appears: punishment which the culprit accepts, when he is repentant, as a deserved expiation of the sin committed.

Herbart, to tell the truth, considers discipline only as a necessary evil; the proof of this is that, if it were possible, he would remove the burden of it from the educator. It is an inferior duty, not suitable to the high calling of men who take charge of the instruction of the child. The educator is, in his way, an artist; and if a painter, a sculptor, can only rise to

¹ This is fresh evidence of the regrettable condition that in the science of education there is no understanding, no continuity of effort amongst the workers of different nationality, the consequence being that one of them believes he has discovered a theory that is more than half a century old. Mr. Herbert Spencer, in writing to me, has stated that before composing his remarkable essay, he had read neither the *Emile* of Rousseau, nor any work on education except a bad commentary by the Englishman, "Biber," on Pestalozzi.

perfection by means of a concentrated force of genius, entirely absorbed in its art, freed from all the accessory and inferior work of his trade; so it is desirable that a teacher whose mission it is to educate the inner being of the child, should not have to dissipate a part of his mental power and energy on the cares and anxieties of discipline.

The government of children approaches to moral education when it is based upon and supported by "authority" and "affection": two auxiliaries the action of which is so much the more important, since by permeating discipline they tend to render it useless. That is, again, another reason for preferring domestic to public education.

What teacher could rival parents, who would lay claim to excel or even equal them in matters of authority and affection? If authority is naturally vested in the father, does not the mother claim first place in affection, "the mother who, at the price of endless sacrifices, succeeds in discovering the needs of her child better than any one else could do, who communicates with him in his first speech of which she alone has the secret, who, favoured by the refinement of her feminine nature, knows how to find the familiar accent which harmonizes with the tender feelings of the child, and whose gentle control, if it is not clumsily exerted, never fails of its end"?

From a stranger, from any educator whatever, it is evidently not possible to ask the same love, the same penetrating force of affection. How could the passing teacher exert the same ascendancy over his pupils as the abiding family, which from birth has wrapped the child in tenderness, in a sustained bond of feeling and habit? Authority and love are not the less at school than at home precious co-workers with discipline, so far as the school can make use of them, and they will endure, forming a solid base for true education and moral culture.

The period arrives, in fact, —and we hasten toward it, —when government should disappear; or at least should relax its imperious authority, in order to give place to an education which will prepare the child to direct himself. It is here that Herbart reaches the culminating point of his pedagogical doctrine, the part that is most essential and important in his system. The child should be freed as soon as possible from the swaddling-clothes which outside influences have woven, in order that he may become an autonomous being, a moral person, who draws from internal forces his rules of conduct and moral laws, without having, henceforth, need to ask them from external guardians. "Education would be a tyranny if it did not lead toward freedom."

But just as it was impossible to understand Her-

bart's theory of instruction without a preparatory review of his psychology, so a glance at the principles of his ethics is indispensable for finding the key to his pedagogy of morality.¹

Herbart moralizes outside the beaten paths. His moral theories are exceedingly personal, closely associated, in fact, with his system as a whole. He aspired, he says, to continue and complete the practical philosophy of Kant, and while doing so to correct it; in reality he demolishes it, leaving nothing standing. His ethics, in fact, is a morality without free will, a morality without obligation. He admits neither transcendental liberty, nor the categorical imperative, the very foundations of morality such as was conceived by the author of *The Criticism of the Practical Reason*. Transcendental liberty, considered from the pedagogical point of view alone, and understood not purely as a dream, renders all education useless and impossible, just as much as an absolute fatalism would do. It may be taken for granted that the fatalism of Spinoza, since it views all things as ruled *a priori* by the decrees of an inexorable destiny, condemns to failure all educational effort. But it is interesting in other respects

¹ See the remarkable articles of M. Dereux: "On the foundations of morality according to Herbart," in the *Critique philosophique*, for December, 1888, and January, March, and May, 1889.

to prove that Kant, too, with his strange conception of a super-sense freedom, independent of experience, active before time began and beyond time, sterilizes and paralyzes the power of education. How affect a being whose destiny has been fixed beforehand by a mysterious will, by a miraculous *coup d'état*, causing in advance a break in empirical determinism, in the chain of human actions? When a man enters into this world he has already voted for good or evil in his future actions. Nothing will be able to influence him. The man who thinks he can be made better is only dreaming. One man can no longer affect another; instruction, warning, punishments, — these accomplish nothing. If, then, transcendental liberty has the power to modify a man's acts, independently of his reason and well-reflected motives, it is clear that the characteristic feature of the ethics of Kant is nothing but empirical determinism, hanging, one knows not how, from a first postulate of metaphysical freedom; and consequently it destroys all attempts at reform and moral progress; it denies the possibility of education.

Herbart, a realist in philosophy, could not admit in any way such an arbitrary and unreal hypothesis as that of transcendental liberty. Neither is one surprised that he refuses to bow down before the categorical imperative of Kant, and, in general,

before any idea of moral obligation. To believe in obligation, that is to say, in a command addressed by reason to the will, we must begin by believing in reason itself; for the same argument there must also be a will. Now, we know that the psychology of Herbart does not admit any primitive faculty; reason and a moral conscience he excludes as much as intellect and sensibility; there is nothing but a confused mass of representations, and, as it were, a dust-cloud of ideas, the confusion of which allows the construction of mental unity, a form of activity not granted by nature. The child, then, is born without moral ideas, as without will. Practical reason, as well as theoretical reason, arises gradually from objects represented in consciousness, and from the relation of these objects. It is in no way a first principle, a fundamental law. It is deduced and derived. In consequence, duty (of this Herbart does not even pronounce the name) is no longer the sovereign rule of our actions, established on an idea of the good. Good in itself does not exist. Morality, like understanding as a whole, is only the resultant from a series of operations, the product of experience.

It would seem, however, at the first glance, that Herbart admits a different conception. He speaks of a moral ideal, and he distinguishes five ideas as

being the elements of it. But these ideas, as we shall see, are neither anterior nor superior to experience; they spring from it. They are the effect rather than the cause of morality. It is not they which determine us to be virtuous; but it is because we are virtuous that they take shape in the mind. That is to say, that a good man forms a conception of them as the ideal standard for his actions, by a sort of abstraction from his virtues; but it is not they which form the good man.

Let us enumerate and define these five moral ideas, which Herbart separates absolutely from one another, and which he considers irreducible. They are, indeed, not simple notions. In Herbart's philosophy there is nothing simple except the soul, which is unknowable and inert. Everywhere there is connection, relation, function. Thus the first moral idea, *inner liberty*, is only a relation between the judgment and will when they agree. A desire is conceived; the judgment approves of it; consciousness of this harmony is liberty, as Herbart understood it: not an independent power which weighs different motives and selects, but simply the pressure exerted by one idea over another to bring about an action. The mind is then at peace with itself. The man who acts deliberately in conformity with his thoughts, is free inwardly and subjectively.

The notion of *perfection* takes the second place, and is again only a relation between two ideas, two acts of the will, of which one surpasses the other in nobility because it is the better of the two; in intensity, if it is the stronger; in extension, if it comprehends a greater number of objects; finally, in concentration, if it firmly coördinates this diversity of objects. A mathematical bent of mind always directed the speculations of Herbart, and moral perfection, one can see, is for him only a question of quantity, we were going to say of dimension, in the amount and force of will power.

However that may be, the first two moral notions concern only the relation between acts of will in one and the same person; they belong to what is known as individual morality; they concern personal progress, of which the maxim is, "Make yourself perfect." The three other ideas—*good-will*, *law*, and *justice*—regard, on the contrary, social morality; they presuppose will relationships between two or more different persons. Let us place ourselves in the presence of our kind; if our own will conforms to the will of others, if we desire that this external will finds satisfaction and reaches its end, we have then a kind or benevolent notion. If of two wills desiring the same object neither will yield, there is a conflict; this conflict is disagreeable, contrary to

order; it must be avoided, the struggle ended; that is the notion of law (*droit*). Finally, if the strife has not been adjusted, if one person has transgressed his rights, the order that has been disturbed and injured must be restored, and agreement between the wills be reestablished, thanks to the sanctions and compensations which render to each what belongs to him: that is the notion of justice.

We need not delay to criticise this particular classification of moral concepts: what is alone of importance to us, is to prove that they claim in no way to be the first principles of moral conduct. They do not derive their force from a direct and original revelation to consciousness. If one might compare them with the "Ideas" of Plato, for they also are models or examples of moral beauty, they are not reminiscences, reflections of a world of supersensible realities. They are purely mental constructions, and follow upon action more than they determine it. Just as representations, when associated, form the intellect, so acts of will, when repeated, construct the moral ideal. There is perfect parallelism between the development of theoretic reason and of practical reason. We begin by action; then we reflect, and from reflection come the great ideas which henceforth give direction to human conduct. Once conceived, in fact, they contribute to en-

lighten our judgment, and in a certain measure they become the agents of moral culture. They are lighthouses which illuminate the pathway of life as long as a man acts; they do not shine when he starts, but their light accompanies humanity on its march.

Since it is not in moral ideas, as Herbart understands them, that we must seek the principle of virtue, where shall we, then, find it? He replies without hesitation, in an *æsthetic necessity*. In his view, the good and the beautiful are not separable. A moral judgment is an *æsthetic* judgment. That is a singular conception, which was suggested to Herbart, so it would seem, by the theory of music. He was a good musician, as we have already said, and it was the study of sound-relationships which in part suggested to him his theory of the relationship of acts of will. According to him, *æsthetic* judgments are absolute. They do not require demonstration. They assert themselves with complete authority. "If we ask a professor of counterpoint for a demonstration of the beauty of a sound, he could only laugh, or perhaps pity the stupid ears which have not already appreciated it." Moral judgments, since they are *æsthetic*, have the same character. They need only show themselves to secure our approval, to exercise over our resolutions a gentle constraint. They per-

suade at once. "As soon as an æsthetic judgment springs up in the soul, it is felt as a force. This is the gentle pressure that mankind calls conscience."

We are explaining Herbart's theory, not criticising it. To how many objections is he not exposing himself in attributing to taste, to æsthetic judgment, the authority which his system did not permit him to require from moral law, from a command of the reason resting upon a notion of the good, or of duty? It will suffice to put forward only one such objection: that this authority appears very precarious, very fragile, and without any assured efficacy. How could a judgment pronounced by taste become a principle of obligation? How could an appreciation of beauty suffice to determine action?

Still, accepting Herbart's theory as it stands more ingenious than solid, let us try to understand how this theory of a morality interchangeable with æsthetics, can be reconciled with the great principle of educative instruction. Moral education, let us not forget, is in direct and strict correlation with intellectual education. In order, then, that moral education, thus accepted, be possible, æsthetic judgment must itself be formed by instruction. At first approach it appears as if there were here two distinct theories, and that to reconcile them would be a matter of some difficulty. This is the fashion,

however, in which Herbart explains the possibility of such a union, of the required articulation. To form the æsthetic judgment, certain mental states must be brought about. Objects must be clearly represented and sharply defined; also calmness, order, and stability must reign amongst representations as they succeed each other. In a word, character has to be formed. Now, character is a system of regular representations, desires, and acts of will, all firmly united, the result of instruction that is solid and full.

Character consists of a man's desires, and he desires what he persistently thinks about. Instruction, then, is the principle of the formation of character. It is true that other elements contribute to the good functioning of voluntary activity. Herbart admits that assurance and courage are, in part, the effect of our physical constitution, of good health. "Feeble and sickly natures feel themselves dependent; robust natures alone dare to exercise their will." It is for this reason, also, that he deems he may say: "A man usually has more character than a woman, just because he is superior to her in physical strength."¹ It is not, therefore,

¹ To appease the self-respect of women, let us quote another passage: "Man is often inferior to woman; as regards wisdom, she can promptly distinguish and note in social relationships things that are barely perceptible and escape the observation of men."

less true that the education of character depends especially on the education of ideas, and that teaching plays much the heavier rôle in moral culture.

That is why the child, in his first years, and while still ignorant, has no character, or at least possesses only that inferior form of character called by Herbart (who is always drawing distinctions) *objective*. Objective character consists of the whole of the desires, fancies, caprices, and passions to which the organism gives birth before the thinking will has made its appearance. In this fluid state of child nature, at a time when representations, as ill ordered as the waves of the sea, rush after one another, covering each other in confusion, the real character, what in the terminology of Herbart is called *subjective* character, cannot yet grow firm. That will reveal itself only when reflection and reasoning power control and rule the capricious and inconsistent desires of the child, by uniting his ideas in permanent groups.

It is fixity of ideas, rigorous association, that insures force of character. To designate this persistence of the same representations, Herbart invented the expression "memory of the will." The term is neat and expressive, but possibly only the term is new. The memory of the will, that is to say, a will always in harmony with itself, — as opposed to

wills wavering and failing, — or, again, a disposition to desire always the same things upon the same occasions, is not this what the old psychology called custom? There is no character so long as there is no persistency and constancy of ideas. Herbart mistrusts dispositions that are unsteady, and therefore light. He speaks in a joking way of those young men who to-day take six courses of study, to-morrow will work alone, and the next day set out on a journey. What he approves in the child as a condition favourable to successful education, is a disposition to will strongly, even when this is accompanied by a measure of obstinacy.

If calm, reflective minds make strong characters, something else is, however, yet wanting to complete a moral education: there must be action. And here Herbart seems to hesitate between his fundamental principle, instruction, and a quite different conception, the importance of exercise, of the part played by action. If the child is developed merely passively, under a system of constraint, he will reach manhood without possessing character. In consequence, it is right to give free course to the energy and initiative of the child. To help him to morality, we ought not to depend on precepts confided to the memory. A maxim is efficacious only when it has been, so to speak, lived, when per-

sonal action has given it life, and it has become, in a manner, a fragment of our autobiography. The child who, from his earliest years, has been accustomed to give water to the thirsty, or food to the hungry, is prepared to formulate this general rule of morality: "Render aid to your neighbor whenever he has need of it." And, in an inverse sense, a defect of character proceeds only from a fault repeated several times.

Herbart, in his pedagogy of morality, does not forget his pedagogy of the intellect. Thus a many-sided interest appears to him to be one of the essential conditions of morality. A mind unfurnished with a rich store of ideas is exposed to egoism: its limited knowledge leaves the field open to base desires. We are certainly not going to contest that morality may expect to advance with instruction and with the widening of the circle of ideas; but we ask, nevertheless, whether Herbart does not propose for moral culture an unattainable ideal, in making variety, extent, and multiplicity of knowledge a condition of virtue. Does not that exclude from the moral life all whose condition condemns them to remain more or less ignorant or men of partial culture? An æsthetic morality having as foundation universality of knowledge, is that a morality suited to all the world? One may doubt it.

Just as the ancient Greek philosophers moralized only for the privileged classes and forgot the slaves, so Herbart, in his conceptions of morality, appears to have in view only a society of scholars: a morality that will serve only the select few.

An æsthetic intellectualism, that might be a definition of morality according to Herbart. We cannot speak to him of sentiments as sources of virtue, for sentiments have their origin in ideas. It is no longer true to say with the ancient moralists that "great ideas spring from the heart." It is the contrary that is true: it is the heart that grows warm and animated under the influence of ideas.

But, whatever may be the confidence professed by Herbart in the moralizing value of an instruction which conforms to the rules traced out in his "didactics," he does not the less distinguish special methods of moral culture. There are, in fact, precautions to be taken to insure the regular development of ideas, and possibly, at times, his reflections will appear to us to contradict the fundamental principle of his system, and lead him to search elsewhere than in instruction for the conditions of moral education.

To follow the same order and plan adopted by Herbart, we shall distinguish with him six things to be done in moral culture. This is the list of them:

(1) support the child; (2) incline him to act; (3) establish rules; (4) maintain in his soul calmness and serenity; (5) stimulate his intellect with approval and censure; (6) warn and correct him.

To tell the truth, that is an arbitrary enumeration rather than an exact and rigorous classification. They are like six somewhat frail points of attachment, on to which Herbart hangs all the prescriptions suggested by his great anxiety for the training of character. They are not all new, far from it; and Herbart is the first to acknowledge that often he is only deriving inspiration from old traditional experience, experience that centuries of reflection have established and rendered trustworthy.¹

The first rule of this scheme of moral culture seems like a prolongation into education of the need of discipline. We must, in fact, continue to "control" (*tenir*) the child; that is to say, to keep order, lest disobedience and disorderliness interrupt and obstruct the course of personal education, and the child, in using his liberty, oversteps the prescribed limits. Above all else, dissipation and indolence are to be combated. In consequence, one must take care that the child is always occupied, and the best

¹ Herbart had none of the empty vanity of an inventor: "Humanity," he wrote, "has already gathered along the road a great number of truths; it is our part to profit by them."

occupations are those which he chooses for himself, in accordance with his tastes: serious occupations rather than play;—for games quickly weary him. We must take pains to profit by good tendencies in the natural character of the child, in order to strengthen these, the first germs of morality. We shall rarely command him, and only in cases of absolute necessity. By uniformity in the manner of life which we prescribe, we shall endeavour to promote the development of the memory of the will. A teacher equable in temper, always calm, and in full control of himself, who does not pass from excessive indulgence to excessive severity, will contribute to inspire analogous qualities: tranquil and patient moderation in the child. Finally, authority and affection will continue to play an important rôle both at home and at school; the child must have a lively sentiment that the approval of parents and masters is a possession which he can either keep by deserving it, or risk to lose.

In the second place, moral culture exercises the child in doing. It teaches him what he must bear and suffer, in order to possess what he desires or do what he likes. It teaches him, at the cost of his own experience, “that the flame burns, the needle pricks, that falling is dangerous.” In a word, it habituates him to control himself, by furnishing

him with opportunities of choosing between different motives for action. But here one is tempted to stop Herbart, and to ask him whether his psychological mechanism, seeing that it covers voluntary acts as well as manifestations of thought, permits him to speak of choice or of option. In very fact, there is no place in his moral mechanism for free self-determination. It is no longer a question of liberty to compare different grounds of action, and after reflection, decide for one or the other. There are present only different groups of ideas and a struggle or conflict between them. It is the strongest element, the dominant group of ideas, which comes off victor and leads to a decision. To this Herbart will reply that it is precisely the business of instruction to cause certain ideas to prevail, and, in consequence, it forms in us the only real liberty, which is none other than harmony between what we think and what we wish.

The third point in moral culture consists of establishing "rules" and maxims of conduct. Here is the place for dogmatic instruction in morality. The five moral ideas may now begin to exert their sway over conduct. Just as it is imprudent to reason with children at an age when they themselves cannot share in an argument, so now it becomes necessary to discuss with them and to show them the

consequences of their actions; to make them, indeed, understand what is the advantage to them of obedience to the general rules by which they ought to feel bound.

Moral culture should be inspired by the notion that peace of mind, if it is the end of virtue, is also one of its conditions; and hence arises the necessity of maintaining "calmness and serenity." This end will be attained by encouraging the natural gayety of the child, by seeking every means of keeping it good-humoured, by letting it live its child life, by excluding the wearisome and fruitless studies which hamper the free movement of his mind. Above all, we shall be careful that his desires do not degenerate into passions through excessive stimulation, and for this reason we shall permit to them only a moderate measure of satisfaction. At need, we shall remove the desired object. We shall direct the activity of the child toward the study of the arts, music, and painting; and if he lacks talent, we shall fall back on other occupations, collecting plants, insects, or shells, gardening, or cardboard modelling, or even carpentry. Herbart favours manual work. Émile as carpenter is not a displeasing sight to him. "All men," he says, "should learn to make use of their hands, for the hands take honourable rank by the side of speech in elevating

men above the animals." In such ways we shall find means of diverting the child from disturbing passions, passions which darken the mind at the period when a calm and quiet spirit, ready always to conceive clearly, is alone in a fit condition to form æsthetic judgments.

When Herbart recommends recourse to approval and blame, — his fifth rule, — it appears to us that he is departing from his system and destroying its framework. In fact, he calls to his aid a foreign agency: the judgment of others. Is it really true that the child is unable to attain to virtue spontaneously, by himself alone, by the energy of his character, influenced solely by instruction? We must support him on the right path; by censure and by the punishment which follows thereon, we must recall him to it; above all, he needs — for Herbart desired that all men should grow up "without one word of deserved blame falling on their ears" — that approval and its consequent rewards should have influence on his resolutions and conduct. Let us not reproach Herbart with a happy contradiction, which makes him admit that one can, and one should moralize the child by praise and by reprimand; measures which will succeed only when the master has known how to win the esteem and affection of his pupils.

The sixth and last mode of moral culture is hardly

distinguishable from the previous one: "Warning and exhortation" [approach very closely to reprimand, and also to correction. Herbart considers, however, that one can give advice without adding reproach, and that correction is profitable only when gentle. The child must be handled humanely; we must feel all the noble and good that there is in him, and avoid all harshness, not only in acts but also in speech. Moral culture, as defined, is "a continuous treatment": the personal work of a master who employs, above all else, benevolent methods, who knows how to make himself agreeable to a child, and to please him by the interest that he manifests in him; who does not forget that it is a matter not so much of bending the will but of forming it, having regard to the reasonable being who one day will develop from a creature yet feeble in regard to ideas, weak and unstable in its will; who, in short, knows how to adapt himself in his rôle as teacher to that fine epigram: "We love the child; but in the child we love the coming man."

Herbart had a *multiple* mind, what English people call *many-sided*, and Germans *vielfältig*. He saw things on all sides. He turned a question round and round on all its faces. We are not surprised then, when, in the laborious and difficult task of reconstructing a moral education of which he had

destroyed the classic foundations, after having had recourse to all sources of instruction, even to all the sciences, and above all else, to æsthetics, Herbart turns to religion, to what he calls "religious interest." He by no means founds morality on religion, but religion appears to him as a friend and protectress of morality. He does not say whether we could do without religion; but if the case stands so that we think we ought to have recourse to its support, then it is useful and effective; there is, however, one condition: it must be accepted in its noblest sense. Herbart knew the perils and the excesses of religious faith, and he denounces them. He commends a religion of the inner man, stripped of vain practices. He ridicules children who kneel after the fashion of little girls, holding a prayer-book in their hands with the air of young saints. He scourges the religious hypocrites who think to cover and excuse bad deeds by acts of devotion. In his opinion, religious instruction is a general instruction which underlies and permeates all particular faiths; which is essentially Christian, and yet preaches love for those even of a different faith. Religion, as conceived by Herbart, is indeed wide and tolerant; for he requires that it should be strengthened in instruction in the classics by reading the *Dialogues* of Plato; and also that religious instruc-

tion should be united with instruction in natural science.

What Herbart expects from religious instruction is that it should assist the teacher to fight against egoism; that it should develop the feeling of humility in the child, the feeling of the dependence of individuals in their relationship to nature and to a Supreme Being. As to the time when it is right to begin religious education, about this he hesitates and remains vague; we must, he says, if we wish to make deep impressions, neither hasten it nor delay it too late. He is very emphatic, and in advance of modern ideas when he relieves teachers of the care of the religious instruction, which then becomes the duty of the family and of theologians, that is to say, of the ministers of the various sects. "The church," he says, "may maintain relations with the school, but it must not dominate it." That is not yet to separate them; but it is already a first step on the road to enfranchising the laity. A separation which he proclaims necessary, from the present in any case, is that of religion and science. It is doubtless necessary for the soul to have the right to rest in peace and unity in its religious belief; but it is also necessary that scientific speculation should follow its course on its own account with freedom, without uneasiness, and without hin-

drance. Philosophy is neither orthodox nor heterodox; it has its own field; it works outside dogmas; and religion cannot claim either to hinder the activity of the reason or to bind the forces of nature.

V

IF the worth of a thinker may be measured by the number of works suggested by him to disciples and critics, I can well believe that Herbart has no rival. There is a Herbartian library, the wealth and extent of which is not equalled even by the Pestalozzian library. Around the work of a single man a whole literature has grown up. In his *Encyklopädische Handbuch der Pädagogik*, M. Rein, the noted professor at Jena, devotes nearly 200 pages to the bibliography of the subject, and he reckons that no less than 2234 books or pamphlets have been published on Herbart in Germany and Switzerland alone. According to Mr. Felkin, the English translator of Herbart, there are actually about ten periodicals devoted to spreading the master's doctrine. A whole legion of commentators, moralists, psychologists, philosophers, and teachers have risen up to interpret the ideas of Herbart, to popularize them, to carry them farther and put them into practice; sometimes to correct and oppose them.

But if the ideas of Herbart have made a remarkable stir in general philosophy, it is in the field of education that the impulse given by him has been specially powerful and promises to endure. This writer, almost unknown amongst us, has become amongst his countrymen the hero and ruling spirit of modern education. He has formed a school. His disciples have multiplied, and for fifty years now they have succeeded each other from generation to generation, unceasingly in the chairs of pedagogy at the German universities, in gymnasiums (grammar or high schools), as well as in normal schools and primary schools. We have read again recently in a Swiss journal, *l'Éducateur*, this significant passage, "If in Germany Pestalozzi was the founder, his successor, the philosopher Herbart, has been the logician and organizer of modern pedagogy; and his methodical work, having rendered service to first one and then another distinguished man, still maintains its place intact and full of energy, sanctioned by a hundred years of experience and success."¹

It would, however, not be exact to say that the followers of Herbart have maintained the system of

¹ *L'Éducateur*, the organ of the pedagogical society of Latin Switzerland, February 28, 1903. The chief editor of this journal, M. F. Guex, director of the normal schools of Lausanne, is himself a convinced and practical Herbartian, who applies in his schools some of the methods recommended by Herbart.

the master in its integrity. They have rejected certain parts of their heritage which are obviously out of date; they have modified others, either developing or amending them. They have in their mitigated or improved Herbartianism remained faithful only to the dominant ideas of the head of the school. These have been applied and explained, and to tell the truth, we know and understand Herbart better when we have read his successors, be it only through the exaggerations into which, at times, they have let themselves be drawn, where the errors of his doctrine appear writ large and in full relief.

For example, two of the most brilliant representatives of the Herbartian school, Ziller (1817-1883) and Stoy (1815-1885), obeyed a common inspiration, — for the rest, with differences and many personal opinions, they were original and inventive, and thus have contributed the most to popularize the methods of Herbart. In spite of their disagreements and the differences which separated them, we find them in 1868 collaborating at the foundation of a great pedagogic association, *Verein für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik*, the title of which indicates its aim, an aim dear to Herbart, to establish a scientific pedagogy. Also they were not content, either of them, to write books, give lecture courses, and revivify the ideas of Herbart: copying what he

attempted at Königsberg they have exerted themselves to organize and direct institutes of education, pedagogical seminaries.

Herbartianism in Germany is a religion with its orthodox and heterodox members. Ziller, in fact, was neither the one nor the other: he was simply an independent Herbartian, who added to the common stock a certain number of new things. Stoy, and after him his successor at Jena, Dr. Rein, are to be considered rather orthodox Herbartians, faithful preservers, fervent guardians of the doctrine.

It was in 1862 that Ziller established at Leipzig a pedagogical seminary, which continues still, and to which is attached a practice school. The titles of his books indicate the Herbartian tradition and recall its terminology: *Introduction to General Pedagogy* (1856), *The Government of Children* (1857), *Principles of the Doctrine of Educative Instruction* (1865). Ziller, like Herbart, believes that in municipal schools instruction may and should be essentially an instrument for educating mind and character. It is to justify this claim that he discusses one by one the selection of the subjects of instruction, their rank and coördination, "in order to arrive at the most perfect grasp of science, the highest moral ideal." Ziller certainly makes great mistakes, and it is not quite without reason that he has been severely criticised and almost

mishandled; and Stoy as well, in the articles by M. Buisson in the *Dictionnaire de pédagogie*. Even in Germany the critics have not spared him. Stoy, although he was a Herbartian too, treated him as a "Visionary." "All that is good in Ziller," said Stoy, "is not new, and what is new is not good." Emancipated disciples generally dispute thus with each other within the lines of the doctrines of a great master. . . . It is easy to gibe at the concentration plan invented by Ziller, which consists in making literature, or perhaps sacred or national history, the centre of instruction. He connects all the other studies of each school year with a study in literature or history: the first year, with twelve fables or stories from Grimm; the second year, with *Robinson Crusoe*; the third year, with the story of the Patriarchs, and so on. That these methods are odd I grant you; but the end sought by Ziller—though he may not have discovered the true means of reaching it—is not, therefore, the less worthy of attention and praise. Who can fail to approve of the effort he made to systematize instruction, to articulate firmly one with another its different parts in a unified plan and in harmonious relationship. Too often teachers—and especially is this the case in the curricula of our French schools—pile together pell-mell all the subjects of instruction with-

out troubling themselves about establishing connections, or making them converge to a single goal. There is succession and juxtaposition of studies, but there is no coördination. Each professor follows his own path, teaches his own science, without troubling himself about what his neighbours are doing. Each pupil passes without transition from one study to another, from the flowery paths of literature to the rough ascents of science. We must honor Ziller that, in dismay at such scattered studies, he tried to apply a remedy by unifying and fusing together the two groups which Herbart had already marked out: the sciences of humanity and of nature.

Ziller, moreover, gave several reasons for this co-ordination being necessary: two of them are psychological and one is moral. The self is a being that constantly grows larger; its individuality is established and its personality developed] thanks alone to unity amongst the experiences and to the instruction which it receives. There can be no cohesion in mental life if there is no cohesion amongst the studies. In the second place, the condition necessary for progress in instruction and education is that interest should be aroused; and since it is certain that there is hardly a child who has not a natural taste for at least one subject or another, one must connect all the other studies to this fa-

vourite, in order that interest may radiate from the first to the second, and thus onwards. But above all, there is a moral reason to be added on the side of concentration and unity in teaching. Instruction being the true principle of moral culture, it is only when the knowledges have been unified and incorporated one with another, that we can hope to produce that unity of will and action which constitutes solidity of character. In consequence, we must avoid that overburdening, that incoherence and breaking up of curricula, the result of which is to scatter efforts, to disperse the attention of pupils, and to make out of them amateurs who apply themselves to everything in a superficial way and penetrate deeply into nothing.

What Ziller had done at Leipzig, Stoy repeated at Jena; he also established a pedagogical seminary, *das pädagogische Universitäts-seminar*, which under the direction of Dr. Rein is still prospering, and bringing together a large number of pupils. Stoy was a pupil of Herbart at Göttingen, and he gathered from the lips of the master himself the principles of education which he developed in his classes and in his works, the *Philosophic Propædæutics* and *Encyclopedia of Pedagogy* (1861), a second edition in 1878. Like Herbart, he excludes abstract rules and technical terms from the beginning of the studies; he requires

that the child make at first an abundant provision of sense-perceptions. To aim at forming the mind without previously assembling a great many notions, that, said he, would be "like wishing to play on a harp without strings." And it goes| without saying that these notions would be closely linked and associated according to the Herbartian method. But Stoy, nevertheless, did not adopt a concentration plan of studies, such as Ziller formed, on which all the subjects of study had to be grouped around the Holy Scriptures or secular history. Let us add that Stoy recalls his master, Herbart, even in his manner of writing; that the reader is lost in the mazy windings of his expositions and subtle distinctions; that he reaches the point, as some one has said, "of confusing the most simple things"; and in brief, after reading him, one may ask how the head of an institution, a professor, could descend from these clouds of abstraction to set foot amid the realities of practical teaching.

M. Rein succeeded Stoy in 1885, and he has continued the Herbartian propaganda. In the kind of pedagogical laboratory directed by him at Jena, it is chiefly to primary¹ teaching, to the schools of the people, that he applies his methods. M. Chabot, who recently visited the seminary at Jena, found

¹ The school annexed to the seminary at Jena is an elementary school, comprising three classes, of ten pupils each.

M. Rein, with his collaborators, occupied in giving a lesson on the prophets of Israel, and trying to render this history interesting, intuitive, and intelligible to children of seven to eight years of age.¹ Dr. Rein appears to us a wise teacher, very sensible and practical, and also very energetic. He has put together eight volumes, corresponding to the eight years of the elementary school, in which all the material of teaching is expounded. He has accepted with conviction, and applies successfully, the greater part of the methods and processes for exciting attention thought out by Herbart. Every well-conducted lesson must begin with a preparation, just as every play begins with an explanation. The teacher first refreshes the memory of the pupil, recalling ideas familiar to him, so that they may meet the new ideas, and that something from within may come, as it were, to greet and welcome what is approaching from the outside.

Herbart lives again in his disciples, not only because they receive from him the general inspiration for their pedagogy, but also seeing that they imitate him in a taste for formulæ and systematic distinctions. Is it necessary, for example, to invent, as Dr. Rein has done, the term *method whole*, to explain to us that there are in every study distinct

¹ M. Chabot, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

divisions which can be approached only in sequence? Is it necessary that he should give us as many as four reasons to prove the necessity of indicating at the beginning of each lesson the subject about to be treated? . . . But Herbart would not have disallowed these slow, heavy modes of thought, he who complained of the lightness of the French intellect, about which he said that "it does not permit labouring over and exhausting a question."

It is possible to be Herbartian in education without adhering to the errors in Herbart's psychology. Such a disciple, for example, was Otto Frick (1832-1892), who undertook to introduce the ideas of Herbart into secondary teaching, but who absolutely repudiates his empiricism. Frick directed at Halle the celebrated school founded by Francke in the eighteenth century, which, originally intended to receive poor orphans, has now become an enormous institution; it comprises all grades of teaching, and has gathered together as many as four thousand children or young people. It was for the higher classes, especially, that Frick elaborated curricula courses and model lessons, all permeated with the spirit of Herbart. But he does not admit that the mind is an empty receptacle, in which experience stores ideas. Frick, on the contrary, attributes to the soul a very rich, innate content.

We can give only a glance to the history of Herbartianism in Germany. Without speaking of the pure psychologists directly inspired by Herbart, Drobisch, Nahlowsky, Lazarus, Steinthal, and others,¹ how many other noted Herbartians should we not have to mention amongst German philosophers who have engaged in educational matters? The philosopher, Karl Lange, the apperception theorist and Director of the School at Plauen, is he not Herbartian? He, too, has insisted on the strict dependence of education considered as end, on psychology as means. Lindner, whose *Empirical Psychology* (1858) translated into English has contributed to extend in the United States of America the ideas of the teacher of Königsberg, is also Herbartian. There is Beneke, too (1798-1854), he who has opposed the tyranny of Kant's imperative, adopting the theory of Herbart concerning the derived character of pain and pleasure, and the intellectualism of emotional states.²

¹ See the *Contemporary German Psychology* of M. Ribot.

² One ought also to mention Waitz (1821-1864) and his *General Pedagogy* (1852). Amongst living men we should not omit M. de Sallwürk, director of the seminary at Karlsruhe, who has published a fine edition of the pedagogical works of Herbart. He criticises Herbart willingly, but is, nevertheless, penetrated by him. See, for example, his last work: *Home, World, and School*, Wiesbaden, 1902.

For the rest, it must be said that the ideas of Herbart have spread slowly, even in Germany. It was not until thirty years after his death, three-quarters of a century after the publication of his *General Pedagogy*, that public favour turned to him. It took time for him to be understood and appreciated. He was not one of those who, like Rousseau or Herbert Spencer, attract immediately the attention of people by passionate eloquence or incomparably clear, lucid exposition. A system so complicated, so wrapped in mystery and shadow as that of Herbart, could reach success only slowly. But once set on foot, the movement made rapid and brilliant progress. To-day the Swiss and German schools in which humble teachers bend their talents to study and apply the pedagogical precepts of Herbart may be reckoned in thousands. In 1881, at a German congress on elementary teaching, a director of a normal school was charged with a report on the following question: "Should pedagogy in normal schools be based on the system of Herbart?" The reply was emphatically in the affirmative. It was the same at a congress of directors of gymnasiums in 1883. On the agenda for the day had been put the following subject: "How far can the pedagogy of Herbart be applied in secondary

teaching?" The conclusions were here also most favourable.¹

People have sought to find the causes of this extraordinary success. It has been said that even the errors of Herbart have contributed to it, and that they were of a nature to win for him the favour of his countrymen, who enjoy abstruse and abstract conceptions. But it is not only in Germany that Herbart has met with admirers: in America, amongst a people whose intellectual character is, however, very different, he has found disciples as enthusiastic. There is little relationship, it would seem, between the laborious genius of Herbart and the intellect, clear, but at times rather superficial, of the Americans. Yet the fact is certain that, in the United States, Herbart is the fashionable pedagogical authority. Dr. W. T. Harris went so far ten years ago as to say, "There are more adherents of Herbartian pedagogy to-day in America than in Germany itself."² This success, which spreads over two worlds, this growing popularity, cannot otherwise be explained than by real merit in the thinker

¹ There were, however, some discordant voices in this concert of approval, notably that of Dittes, who, in 1881, in his *Pædagogium*, attacked Herbart, amongst other things, for the insufficiency of his statements regarding the relation of instruction to moral education.

² *Report of the Commissioner of Education*, 1894-1895, p. 322.

who has won it. If Herbart has gained a hearing, it is by the incontestable might of his conceptions. It is also because he has a system, a system rich in formulæ: one knows the authority, the fascination, exerted over men's minds by the despotism of a systematic doctrine. Human indolence gladly reposes on the soft bed of a ready-made doctrine, in which everything, even to the smallest details, has been foreseen.

It is now fifteen years since the popularity of Herbart took birth in the United States, and his doctrines were acclimatized there, so that the German teacher became almost an idol for a certain number of his brethren in America. In the first rank we note M. de Garmo, director of a college in Pennsylvania,¹ who has translated several books on Herbartian pedagogy: the *Introduction to the Pedagogy of Herbart*, by Chr. Ufer, and Lindner's *Empirical Psychology*, and who has himself devoted to Herbart, in his list of *Great Educators*, a work full of research.² It is from Germany that M. de Garmo derived the spirit of Herbartianism with

¹ M. de Garmo is now Professor of Education in Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.—TRANS.

² *Herbart and the Herbartians*, 1895. M. de Garmo is the indefatigable popularizer of the theories of Herbart. He has published in the pedagogical reviews of the United States a large number of articles on the subject.

which he had thoroughly steeped himself, when he was following the lectures of Stoy at Jena, or when he was the colleague of Frick at Halle, where he taught for two years. But before de Garmo, others had broken a pathway.

In 1889, Miss M. K. Smith translated the *Psychology* of Herbart. In 1892, — the same year when there was founded at the end of the annual Educational Congress held at Saratoga by the *National Educational Association*, the Herbartian Club, with one hundred members, — Dr. C. A. McMurry, Professor of Pedagogy in the University of Illinois, published the *Elements of General Method*, in which he set forth in a sympathetic way the views of Herbart, as interpreted by Ziller, Stoy, and Rein. No book could explain better than this of Dr. McMurry what has attracted Americans to the pedagogy of Herbart. What they desire, above all, to derive from him, is the tendency to widen the field of studies, to form minds rich, well-furnished with substantial knowledge, rather than penetrating and refined minds; it is a well-considered intention to break with the old routine, with the formal culture which we used to require from a small number of studies, chiefly languages or mathematics; the current now sets toward studies which offer the most content, — history and the natural sciences. Dr.

McMurry opposes energetically what he calls the superstition, the fetichism, of "studies of pure form." What has further won over the young and modern American spirit is the fact that Herbart was the philosopher of interest, of attractiveness, and that he opposed asceticism in education. It is not at New York or at Chicago that people resign themselves easily to believe that the earth is only a "valley of tears," and that instruction is so much the more profitable as it is disagreeable and painful.

We could multiply examples. Is not Colonel Parker, the Director of the Normal School of Cook County, a man very noted in America, also inspired by Herbart, — notably, in his plan of "concentration" of studies?¹ The term is the same, and the method analogous. And can we not also consider as enrolled under the Herbartian flag, W. James, the most celebrated of the psychologists of the United States? In his recent book, *Talks on Psy-*

¹ Colonel Parker died in 1902. He was then Director of the School of Education in Chicago University. It seems only fair to his memory to state that he expressly repudiated the idea that he was a follower of Herbart; in general educational theory he was nearer to Froebel. His plan of concentration differed widely from that of Ziller and Rein, there being no single *centre of studies*, the centre he adopted with insistence and persistence being *the child*. See *Pedagogics*, by Francis Parker, in the International Education Series. — TRANS.

chology,¹ we find the name of Herbart often cited, and some of his favourite theories reproduced: that there is no general training of a hypothetical faculty of memory, that there can be only special cultivation of particular groups of associated memories, that the value of instruction lies in correlation, in a constant adjustment of new to old knowledge, and lastly, that interest is the law of instruction, under this condition, however, that a seeking after attractiveness does not render education too pleasant and too soft, and that, without suppressing effort, it aims only at rendering it possible and easy.

Germany and the United States are the two centres from which Herbartian influence radiates. But little by little it is penetrating into all the countries of the world as far as Japan. In England the translations of Mr. and Mrs. Felkin have won many disciples; this is proved by different publications: the humorous volume of Professor John Adams, *The Psychology of Herbart applied to Education*;² the recent little book of Professor Darroch, *Herbart and his theory of Education*,³ despite its critical tone;

¹ *Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on some of Life's Ideals*, by William James, New York, 1899.

² *The Herbartian Psychology applied to Education*, by John Adams, London, and Boston, U.S.A., 1898.

³ *Herbart and the Herbartian Theory of Education*, by Alexander Darroch, London, 1903.

and as is shown by such testimony as that of Mr. Oscar Browning, "Herbart is a psychologist of first rank, one might say the founder of modern psychology."¹ The translations of Mr. Felkin have largely contributed to this diffusion of Herbartian doctrine in the Anglo-Saxon world, everywhere where the English tongue is spread; thus it happens that in Australia, the *Calendar*, the Annual of the University of Adelaide, for 1903 announces a special study in the pedagogy of Herbart among the courses of mental science, and that "the students will read the *Science of Education* in the volume by Felkin."

In Italy as well, the works of Herbart have not failed to attract attention. From 1886 Professor Fornelli, of the University of Bologna, was publishing *La Pedagogia secondo Herbart e la sua scuola*; and in 1900 appeared *La Pedagogia di G. F. Herbart*, in which Mr. Luigi Credaro, Professor at the University of Pavia, comments sympathetically on the theories of the *Universal Pedagogy*.

We must admit, then, that in France the great German educator has been too long neglected. Very few French philosophers are acquainted with him, — although it might be possible to prove that something from his doctrine has crept into the writings of M. Fouillée or of M. Paulhan, — and those who

¹ Preface to the translation by Mr. Felkin, p. 11.

are, have not always given him fair play ; for proof of this, see the too severe conclusion to the articles by M. Dereux already mentioned, or M. Auerbach in the *Dictionary of Pedagogy*, edited by M. Buisson. Herbart has found a better welcome from M. Pinloche, to whom we owe a translation, unhappily fragmentary and incomplete, of the *General Pedagogy*, and of the *Sketch*; and above all, from M. Mauxion, who, after having studied the metaphysics of our author in his doctor's thesis,¹ published in 1901 under the title, *Education by Instruction and the Pedagogical Theories of Herbart*, a substantial and solid work, to which more than once in the course of our own studies we have had recourse for light and information.²

What will become of this almost universal movement, which has carried Herbart's name to all quarters of the globe? We are convinced it will last and proceed still farther, that a day will arrive when there will be found in other lands besides

¹ *The Metaphysics of Herbart, and the Critique of Kant*, Paris, 1894.

² To complete the list, let us mention also the volume entitled, *Theory of Education according to the Principles of Herbart*, Paris, Delagrave, 1884. The author, M. E. Roerich, has at least the merit of having been the first in France to call attention to the pedagogical writings of Herbart. A very kind welcome and summary was accorded this little work in the *Critique Philosophique*, 1886, t. I, p. 304.

Switzerland and Germany, even in the village schools, hard-working teachers who have recourse to Herbart for safe guidance, or at least for suggestive inspiration, fitted to sustain them in practical teaching.

People will then certainly not concern themselves with his mathematical dreams. They will no longer talk about the strange comparisons which the author of *Letters to Professor Griepenkel* was enjoying, when he said, "The essential element in childish curiosity consists in forming the 'vault,' or the 'point' of his ideas;" or again, "In order to succeed, instruction should arouse in the mind of the pupil ideas which, one by one, round themselves out to a 'vault,' or sharpen themselves into a 'point.'" He indulged himself with the greatest delight in these geometrical analogies; evidently they have no value, but to him they appeared "like a treasure, inexhaustible in their results." They are mere empty redundancies, happily not an integral part of the body of the system, dross which can be easily separated from the fundamental conceptions of Herbart, which are thus rendered more clear and luminous.

Also, — and the best of his disciples have set us the example, — we shall gladly cast aside his chief error concerning the nature of the soul, which deprives it of all self-activity, of all innate or inherited

power. It is not necessary to have recourse to professed philosophers to refute a theory universally condemned, which common sense rejects as contrary to evidence. It seems as if it was to Herbart that Proudhon was replying when he wrote in his too much neglected book, *Justice in the Revolution and in the Church*: "Just as an external communication could not by itself create intelligence and cause winged ideas to dart forth in myriads without the intellectual preformation which makes concepts possible, so also the events of social life would have vainly sought to unfold themselves; without a certain preformation of the heart, that secret command laid by man on himself, which is the origin of justice, could not have come to pass."

How many other criticisms would one not be obliged to make regarding even the pedagogy of Herbart in his endeavours after system? He would establish unity of mental life on the unity of science, the former being, according to him, only a reflection of the order and interrelationship of the knowledges. It is relatively easy to establish this interrelationship within the framework of a simple science, and we must honour Herbart for having insistently demanded this. But how can we follow him to the end, when he nourishes the beautiful illusion of making one system of all the sciences, the sciences of

man and of nature? How coördinate, for example, the study of historic facts with that of mathematical reasoning, or again, the teaching of grammar with that of geography? A vain dream of unity, an illusory hope of concentration and uniformity, led both Herbart and his followers astray. When it was evident that each science has its methods and its own laws, and that, in consequence, those who teach it ought to take into account its special character, they believed it possible by spurious connections and superficial welding to mix and melt together all the subjects taught, and to throw into the same mould all methods of instruction. Unity, desirable in so far as it is possible, is a dream when made absolute. The Herbartians have taken the paradox of Jacotot, "All is within all," too seriously. And supposing that it can be realized, there is yet to prove that the cohesion, when it has been established amongst the mass of knowledges, can in some way be transmitted from the object to the subject, and there bring about mental unity, without the help of general consciousness and native reasoning power.

But these criticisms, and others besides, — it would be easy to lengthen the list, — cannot cause us to forget the many other grounds on which Herbart deserves to occupy a place in the first rank of educa-

tors. His work stands, in our opinion, as one of the most powerful efforts ever put forth to make "all beings with a human face" into men worthy of the name, and to introduce into the art of education the spirit of philosophy and of science.

He had faith in education, and this well-considered and philosophic faith was an active faith, which he testified and proclaimed by fifty years of reflection. No, not in vain did he devote a long life to the study of pedagogical problems, bringing to it not only the resources of a free and profound intellect, but all the warmth also of his heart. He was before all else skilled in reasoning, but the abstractions with which his volumes are replete are based on observation and experience. Reflective and scrupulous to excess in both his writings and his actions, he took up his pen only when he believed he had reached the truth. And just as under the stiff formulæ in which he enclosed his thoughts there moves a spirit that is very supple and resourceful, so under an appearance of coldness there is hidden a generous soul, which at times reveals itself. He has his moments of sentimentality. Might we not think we are listening to one of the reveries of Rousseau on *Émile* and *Sophie* in such a passage as this? "The greatest of all festivals for the educator is the marriage of his pupil; the mar-

riage-bed is the end and the glory of every educator. . . ." Education, in the opinion of Herbart, is not a trade like other trades ; it is a sacred mission. All who engage in the education of their kind, if ever so little fitted for their task, believe themselves below its claims ; and when they think of the difficulties of the work which they undertake, of the responsibilities which they incur, they experience, as it were, a shudder of emotion. Herbart had known this shudder. He placed all his hopes of a better humanity in education ; and that is why he expressed the wish that in each society, in the most secluded village, just as there is a doctor for the health of the body, there should be also an accredited teacher for the health of the soul. He should pay visits to the families and give them advice, and act as consulting educator, watching over the intellectual and moral progress of the young generation.

Herbart had faith in instruction, and on this point also he was before his time. Certainly it may be objected that education by instruction is but a dream, so long as instruction cannot be pushed far enough and produce all the fruit expected from it for the common people ; and it is for this reason that he himself used to say, "The destiny of the world depends on a small number of people." But why not count on a better future, when, in a school of

universal science, virtuous characters will be formed in all men? Herbart was right as compared with Locke who declared that, "Instruction is but the least part of education"; this, doubtless, was because he did not comprehend instruction in the large meaning of Herbart. He is right when compared with Herbert Spencer who, indeed, also made the great mistake of denying the educative power of instruction. He will be proved more and more right in the future, because progress henceforth is bound up with an increasing spread of instruction, and with the development of science.

Herbart had, before all else, a mind clear and free. He considered that "the clear comprehension of things" is the principle of all education. If he rejects the "categorical imperative" of Kant, it is because he sees in it a survival of the old dogmas which claimed to intimate commandments to men without giving reasons. Morality, in his opinion, should no longer be a "barricade": it is a reasonable call to complete living, to an expansion, full, free, and unrestrained, of human nature, under the guidance of interest and charm. We must not believe that Herbart, in favour of this guidance, suppresses effort in life. If he asks less of the child and pupil, he imposes more on parents and masters. Let us confess that, if until now current pedagogy has demanded

a great concentration of effort on the part of those who study, that might well be partly to decrease to the same degree the burden and ease the pains of those who teach. What is in any case certain is this,—that the scrupulous application of the methods of Herbart, with the obligation of carefully preparing each lesson, of adapting the instruction to the actual state of the mind of the person who receives it, of seeking and maintaining interest everywhere, this demands on the part of the teachers at the same time more talent, more knowledge, and more work.

Herbart's own psychology forbade him to be an adherent of the doctrine of evolution, since, according to him, the soul enters into the world naked. His theories, then, seem little favourable to the notion of a progress natural and, so to say, predestined, produced in the race by the accumulation in each generation of successive acquisitions, and transmitted in a natural way from one generation to another. But, in return, and just because they eliminate from humanity the notion of hereditary development, the philosophical conceptions of Herbart favour and render necessary the personal progress of the individual. Man is born without intellectual patrimony, without moral capital. His business is not to cultivate quietly the garden of his

father; he has everything to acquire. He will be whatever the continuous toil of his life makes of him. And is it not thus that the modern spirit tends to represent the ascending course of progress?—no free grace from above, not even help from nature,—although on this point Herbart was too exclusive,—in a great measure, if not entirely, it is the individual building himself, by his own efforts, with the help of science.

In working for individuals, Herbart worked for humanity. "Germans," he said, "have no fatherland;" things have changed since then, and Germans have regained their prestige. He considered himself not a man of one nation or one race only. He constructed philosophic theories for all men, for men of the future, for citizens of a society yet to appear which will unite all human beings in peace and love. The five moral ideas which he defined, rules of individual conduct, would, in his opinion, give birth by deduction to the same number of social ideas, the rulers over nations and over the world. Thus he foreshadowed how, by the end of a gradually expanding flood of instruction, a golden age might be established and spread its power step by step; an age in which conflicts should diminish, benevolence govern men's actions, right and justice be universally respected, man attain to perfection; thus,

finally, the mass of mankind should share in the same ideas and the same sentiments, and the whole of humanity form but one society, a society which, to use his noble expression, "should have one soul."

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
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